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ABSTRACT
The purpose of my dissertation is to investigate how information that should not signal
output quality influences managers’ evaluations. To address this objective, I pose the following
research question: In a setting where professional employees generate output that cannot be
evaluated objectively, will managers use work-day duration to subjectively evaluate the quality
of their output?
I address my research question using two experiments where I vary employees’ work-day
duration relative to their peers (short versus equal) and the purpose of the evaluation (bonus
versus promotion) while observing how supervisors make subjective quality evaluations about
their output. I find that when work-day duration is short and the purpose of the evaluation is a
bonus, employees are perceived as less hardworking, and receive lower evaluations of output
quality compared to when work-day duration is equal. I also find that when work-day duration is
short and the purpose of the evaluation is a promotion, employees are perceived as efficient and
receive higher evaluations of output quality compared to when work-day duration is equal.
Importantly, this second finding is observed only when the employees’ output is of good quality,
but not when it is of moderate quality.
My dissertation contributes to existing literature. First, while existing research examines
effort duration or intensity on particular tasks, to the best of my knowledge, my dissertation is
the first study to consider how employees’ work-day duration can influence subjective
evaluations of their output quality. Second, my dissertation contributes to existing research that
examines inaccurate performance evaluations resulting from cognitive limitations. I identify that
managers’ knowledge about work-day duration, which provides no information about output
quality, influences subjective evaluations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The work of professional employees (e.g., accountants, lawyers, consultants) is difficult
to measure. Professionals’ work often requires the application of specified knowledge which is
evaluated based on its quality. This makes professionals’ output difficult to evaluate with
objective performance measures (e.g., quantity of output produced). Instead, the output of a
professional worker is often evaluated based on subjective evaluations of quality rather than
objective evaluations of quantity (Drucker 1999). When no objective performance measures are
available, existing research examines how subjectivity can be used to improve performance
evaluation and compensation contracting (Prendergast 1999; Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede,
and Vargus 2004; Bol 2008). However, an unresolved issue within the subjective performance
evaluation literature is understanding factors that affect managers’ subjective evaluations of
output quality. Therefore, the purpose of my dissertation is to investigate how information that
should not signal output quality influences managers’ evaluations. To address this objective, I
pose the following research question: In a setting where professional employees generate output
that cannot be evaluated objectively, will managers use work-day duration to subjectively
evaluate the quality of their output?
I study the joint effects of work-day duration and the purpose of managers’ evaluations
on subjective evaluations of professional employees’ output. Specifically, I examine whether
managers interpret a short work-day duration (i.e., when professional employees’ work hours are
shorter than the workplace norm) differently from an equal work-day duration (i.e., when
professional employees’ work hours are consistent with the workplace norm), holding the quality
of work produced constant. Notably, in my study, I do not examine how the amount of time
professional employees spend on a particular task (which is often difficult for managers to
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observe) influences subjective evaluations, but rather I examine how the time professional
employees spend at work on a typical workday influences subjective evaluations of a piece of
output.
I draw on attribute substitute theory (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) to predict why
managers may use a contextual cue (i.e., work-day duration) that provides no information about
output quality when making subjective evaluations. According to attribute substitute theory,
when the target attribute is difficult to evaluate, a heuristic attribute can influence judgment and
decision making. In my setting, the manager may have difficulty evaluating subjective output
quality (i.e., the target attribute) and may be easily influenced by contextual cues (i.e., the
heuristic attribute). Therefore, I predict that work-day duration (i.e., a heuristic attribute) is likely
to influence managers’ subjective evaluation of quality (i.e., the target attribute). In this twoexperiment thesis, I consider whether work-day duration is observed in two settings: one where
the employee is considered for a bonus and one where the employee is considered for a
promotion. I consider these two settings because of the inherent differences between bonus
rewards and promotion rewards (Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988; Gibbs 1995).
In my first experiment, I examine a setting where the quality of the employees’ output is
good. I begin by considering managers’ judgments when the subjective evaluations of output
quality will help to determine whether the professional employees will receive a bonus. When
professional employees signal that they are hardworking during the current period, managers
may be more likely to award them with a bonus. As prior research indicates that work-day
duration signals perceptions of hardworking (Elsbach, Cable and Sherman 2010), I predict that
employees who display a short work-day duration are likely to be perceived as less hardworking
than employees who display an equal work-day duration. Therefore, I hypothesize that holding
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the quality of work produced constant, when the performance reward is a bonus and work-day
duration is short, evaluations of subjective quality will be lower than when work-day duration is
equal to the workplace norm.
Next, I consider a setting where evaluations of subjective output help to determine
whether professional employees will receive a promotion. Prior research suggests that promotion
rewards differ from bonus rewards because they not only serve as an incentive but also sort
employees based on important skills and abilities they have (Baker et al. 1988). In other words,
in making promotion decisions, managers need to consider how well-suited employees are for
the next level.1 Similar to when the purpose of the performance reward is a bonus, in promotion
decisions a short work-day duration is likely to signal that employees are not hardworking.
However, I predict that when professional employees produce good quality subjective output,
short work-day duration will send a strong signal that employees are efficient. Although
hardworking is likely to be an important characteristic in promotion decisions, managers may
consider efficiency a stronger differentiating characteristic because efficient individuals are more
likely to adapt to the next level of the job (e.g., to quickly acquire new skills required), an
important characteristic in evaluations of promotability. Therefore, I hypothesize that holding the
quality of work produced constant, when the performance reward is a promotion and work-day
duration is short, evaluations of subjective output quality will be higher than when work-day
duration is equal to the workplace norm.
My first experiment (Experiment One) tests a setting where professional employees’
subjective output quality is good. I conduct a between-participants experiment that manipulates

1

Similar to prior research (Chan 2018), I examine a setting that does not define a promotion rule (i.e., what skills are
required for promotion). As such, I do not define what the promotion criteria is, nor do I define what the promotive
task will be.
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work-day duration (short versus equal) and the purpose of the performance evaluation (bonus
versus promotion). Work-day duration is manipulated by describing the hours that the
professional employee works as either short or equal hours compared to other professional
employees at the same organization (i.e., the workplace norm). The purpose of the performance
evaluation is manipulated by indicating that the evaluation will help to determine whether the
professional employee will receive a bonus or a promotion. I recruit 156 professional participants
online to assume the role of Supervising Manager at a consulting company. Their main task is to
evaluate the subjective output quality (a response memo to a business issue) produced by a single
professional employee.
Results from Experiment One are consistent with my expectations. I find that when the
purpose of the evaluation is to determine a bonus, a short work-day duration results in lower
evaluations of subjective output quality, compared to an equal work-day duration. I also find that
when the purpose of the evaluation is to determine a promotion, a short work-day duration
results in higher evaluations of subjective output quality, compared to an equal work-day
duration. Taken together, my results suggest that when employee output is good and work-day
duration is short, evaluations of subjective output quality will depend on whether the purpose of
the evaluation is to determine a bonus or a promotion.
I perform a second experiment (Experiment Two) that examines whether the joint effects of
work-day duration and the purpose of the performance review persist when subjective output
quality is less than good. The experimental procedures and manipulations in Experiment Two are
identical to Experiment One with one exception: subjective output quality of the response memo
is moderate. I find that when subjective output quality is moderate and the purpose of the
performance reward is a bonus, evaluations of subjective output quality are lower when
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employees work a short work-day duration compared to employees who work an equal work-day
duration. This observation is consistent with Experiment One. However, when subjective output
quality is moderate and the purpose of the performance reward is a promotion, evaluations of
subjective output quality are similar whether employees work a short work-day duration or an
equal work-day duration. This finding is contrary to that of Experiment One. Taken together, I
find that when output quality is moderate, work-day duration continues to affect subjective
evaluations of output in bonus decisions, but not in promotion decisions.
My dissertation makes important contributions to research that examines subjectivity in
compensation contracting. I examine how a non-informative contextual cue can influence
subjective evaluations of output quality and, more specifically, how the role of work-day
duration depends on the purpose of the performance evaluation. First, research in accounting
primarily examines settings where work-day duration is contractible (i.e., employees are required
to spend a specified amount of time at work), and performance is ultimately increased by
incentivizing effort intensity (i.e., how hard the employee works during the specified amount of
time at work) (e.g., Awasthi and Pratt 1990; Tafkov 2013; Hecht, Rotaru, Schulz, Towry and
Webb 2018). Different from research that examines effort duration or intensity on particular
tasks, I focus on employees’ work-day duration and how it influences subjective evaluations of
their output quality. Second, prior research identifies and empirically examines how evaluator
biases can lead to inaccurate evaluations of subjective performance (e.g., Bol 2008, 2011), and
within that literature, some studies examine how cognitive limitations result in evaluator biases
in subjective evaluations (e.g., Bol and Smith 2011; Bol and Leiby 2018). My study contributes
to this line of research by identifying that a non-informative contextual cue (work-day duration)
influences evaluations of output quality. Thus, my study differs from prior research as I examine
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how non-informative contextual cues influence the subjective evaluation of employees’ work
output as opposed to the assessment of their general performance.
My research has practical importance. My findings indicate that work-day duration is used to
evaluate the quality of subjective output and that its influence depends on the purpose of the
evaluation. This is important as employees are often afforded the opportunity to work flexible
hours. For example, given the changing dynamics of North American families (United States
Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics 2018; Uppal 2015), working parents are increasingly
juggling the demands of working out of the house and effectively managing family
responsibilities (Wademan Dowling 2019). In the meantime, increasingly employers are
requiring that their employees work long hours and be available outside of normal working hours
(Kantor and Streitfeld 2015). My study provides empirical evidence that the quality of work that
is produced by professional employees who work hard in a short amount of time will be
evaluated to be of lower quality when the purpose of the evaluation is to determine whether they
will receive a bonus. However, when the purpose of the evaluation is to determine a promotion
and output quality is good, delivering the same output in a short amount of time signals that the
employees are efficient, which leads to biases of quality evaluations in the opposite direction.
The remainder of my thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, I review psychology,
economics and accounting literatures related to subjective evaluations of bonus and promotion
rewards, and I review the applicability of attribute substitute theory. In Chapter 3, I develop
hypotheses for both experiments. Chapter 4 describes methods for both experiments, and Chapter
5 describes the results from both experiments. Conclusions are provided in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I use the existing economics, psychology and accounting literature to first
examine cognitive limitations in subjective performance evaluations and second to explore why
and how work-day duration and reward purpose could affect subjective evaluations of output
quality. In Section 2.2, I describe subjectivity in performance evaluations, in Section 2.3, I
explore attribute substitution theory and in Section 2.4 I discuss subjectivity and reward purpose.
Conclusions are provided in Section 2.5.

2.2 Subjectivity in Performance Evaluations
In this section, I provide an overview of subjectivity in performance evaluations and
describe the role of subjective performance measures. Within the existing subjectivity literature,
I review studies that examine inaccuracies that can result from either managers’ own self-interest
or from managers’ cognitive limitations.

2.2.1 Overview of Subjectivity in Performance Evaluations
Generally, there are two options for evaluating employee performance: objective
evaluations and subjective evaluations (Bol 2008). Objective performance measures are used
when employees’ output is quantifiable and is verifiable for contracting purposes (Woods 2012).
Examples of objective indicators of performance include levels of sales, profit or asset values
(Rajan and Reichelstein 2009). Subjectivity is included in performance evaluations when it is
difficult to objectively measure performance and is done so in three different ways; first,
performance can be evaluated through subjective performance measures; second, the weight of
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performance measures can be flexible to allow managers to make ex-post changes based on
information learned during the contracting period; and third, ex-post adjustments can be made to
performance measures determined ex-ante to incorporate information learned during the
contracting period (Gibbs et al. 2004). In my dissertation, I examine the subjective measurement
of output quality and, therefore, my primary focus is on the first mechanism: evaluating
performance using subjective measures.2
Subjective performance measures are defined as “superior’s subjective judgments about
qualitative performance indicators” (Moers 2005, 68). They are often used as indicators of
managerial performance for dimensions of employees’ jobs that are difficult or impossible for
organizations to include in compensation contracts (Rajan and Reichelstein 2006, 2009).
Examples of tasks measured by subjective performance measures include “good use of
resources” or “adequate planning” (Moers 2005). These are subjective performance measures
because they are used to reward value-enhancing efforts that are not easy to quantify and
therefore would otherwise be difficult to include in evaluations of performance (Gibbs et al.
2004).
In Sections 2.2.2 to 2.2.3, I review relevant studies that highlight the benefits and costs
that arise when subjectivity is included in evaluations of employees’ performance.
2.2.2 Benefits of Subjectivity
Existing research suggests that the benefits of subjective performance evaluations in
compensation contracts can include compensation risk reduction, reduction of perceived
unfairness, inducement of adaptive behaviour and mitigation of incentive distortions (Bol 2008).

2

While performance evaluations that include a mix of both objective and subjective measures can be effective in
capturing all dimensions of employees’ performance (Prendergast 1999), in my dissertation I examine a single
dimension of an employees’ job that is evaluated solely by subjective measures.
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Subjectivity benefits employees’ contracts because it can reduce the compensation risk to
employees. When only objective evaluations are used, one compensation risk employees can
face is that objective performance evaluations can be negatively influenced by uncontrollable
events (Bol 2008). Uncontrollable events are unknown ex-ante in contract design and therefore
cannot be contracted on explicitly. To reduce this risk to employees, managers can be endowed
with ex-post discretion. This discretion allows managers to incorporate information learned
during the contracting period (e.g., information related to the occurrence of an uncontrollable
event) that was unknown ex-ante in the contact design phase (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1994;
Gibbs et al. 2004).
Archival research provides evidence of ex-post adjustments in subjective performance
evaluations to reduce such compensation risk that relates to the occurrence of negative
uncontrollable events. An archival study of CEO incentive contracts from 579 firms shows that
discretionary bonuses are often included in compensation contracts of CEOs when ex-ante
performance measures are likely to be impacted by uncontrollable events (Höppe and Moers
2011). A second archival study using hand-collected data from 490 firms and 583 firm years
from Form 8k and proxy statements, finds that when objective information results in
measurements of performance that are extreme (i.e., either really low or really high), subjective
information is perceived as informative, resulting in a higher likelihood of discretionary bonus
payments (Ederhof 2010). A third archival study using data collected from performance-equity
plans from 228 public firms in China finds that as environmental uncertainty, CEO power,
competition intensity and non-price competition increases, the likelihood that managers will
provide different weightings of objective versus subjective performance measures for top
managers compared to middle managers is also increased (Chen, Gao, Wang and Xue 2019).
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Research from the field also provides evidence supporting the use of subjective
performance evaluations to reduce compensation risk stemming from the occurrence of negative
uncontrollable events. For example, when sales targets are determined centrally by corporate
headquarters, managers are more likely to use their discretion and set more attainable sales
targets for postal stores that face higher (vs. lower) environmental uncertainty (Bol, Keune,
Matsumura and Shin 2010). A second study of a large US retailer finds that when managers are
exposed to environmental uncertainty and face greater noise from objective measures of
performance, supervisors will increase subjective performance evaluations (Anderson, Dekker,
Sedatole and Wiersma 2020).
Subjectivity also benefits employees’ contracts because it can be used to reduce
perceived unfairness (Bol 2008; Voußem, Kramer and Schäffer 2016). Perceived fairness is
important in performance evaluations because it affects employees’ motivations (Colquitt,
Conlon, Wesson, Porter and Ng 2001). When employees work in teams, perceived fairness is of
particular importance because it is often aggregate team output that is used to determine
individual rewards. Three experimental studies examine how subjective evaluations allow
managers to restore perceived fairness in a team setting (i.e., when team members do not
contribute similarly to aggregate team output). First, in an experiment where 126 undergraduate
student participants perform an effort choice task, when making subjective evaluations,
managers are more likely to obtain costly information about individuals’ contributions to team
performance when aggregate measures provide a noisy signal about individuals’ contributions
(i.e., when aggregate performance is less extreme) (Maas, van Rinsum and Towry 2012).
Interestingly, the study also finds that out of concerns for reciprocity, managers are more likely
to obtain costly information for high levels of extreme performance compared to low levels of
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extreme performance. A second experimental study, using 148 undergraduate students and an
effort choice task, examines how to increase perceived fairness of compensation in a team setting
(Arnold, Hannan and Tafkov 2018). Results of this study show that one way to reduce the costs
of obtaining information about individuals’ contributions to aggregate team output is to endow
employees with the opportunity to provide managers with subjective communication about the
efforts of other team members (i.e., report on mutual monitoring). That said, when team
members have heterogeneous abilities (i.e., they do not have the same ability to generate profit),
the subjective communication is more dispersed, which is less useful to managers. This causes
managers to deviate from individual team members’ subjective communication in their
subjective evaluations. Finally, an experiment using 188 undergraduate students, where some
participants assume a manager role and others assume an employee role, shows that when the
team task is not interdependent, subjective performance evaluations increase team performance,
but when the team task is interdependent, subjective evaluations decrease team performance
(Arnold and Tafkov 2019). The results indicate that when the team task is interdependent,
subjective evaluations have a negative influence on team cohesion, which in turn has a negative
effect on team performance.
In addition to the use of subjectivity to reduce perceived unfairness in teams, subjectivity
in the target setting process also allows managers to restore fairness perceptions when employees
are rewarded based on relative performance evaluations. This is particularly important when the
group of employees under evaluation have heterogeneous abilities. In this case, research using
archival data from 103 postal stores in Korea shows that managers sometimes use discretion exante in the contract design phase and assign more attainable targets to branches with lower
ability to generate profit in order to restore perceptions of fairness (Bol et al. 2010).
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Subjectivity also benefits compensation contracts because it can induce adaptive
behaviours. As priorities of companies may change during the contracting period, allowing
managerial discretion to change the weighting of objective performances encourages employees
to adapt their behaviours accordingly (Bol 2008). For example, in an archival study using CEO
contracts from SEC Proxy Statements, subjective weights are more prevalent when there is
environmental unpredictability (Höppe and Moers 2011). Providing subjective weights in these
fast-changing environments can encourage CEOs to adapt quickly, which better aligns the goals
of the company with the goals of the CEO. Managers also consider how their use of subjectivity
will affect employees’ adaptive behaviour in future periods. In an experimental study using 97
graduate student participants who are required to make bonus allocations of two employees, the
researchers examine whether managers will consider the signal they will send to employees if
they choose to incorporate non-contractible subjective information into their subjective bonus
allocations (Bol, Hecht and Smith 2015). The study finds that when subjective non-contractible
information is the result of an uncontrollable event, managers are more likely to incorporate the
non-contractible information into bonus allocations decisions, but only when the likelihood of
the event is low (i.e., is not likely to reoccur) and the bonus pool is not shared among other
employees.
Finally, subjectivity benefits compensation contracts because it can mitigate incentive
distortions that arise when the compensation contract is incomplete. (i.e., not all job dimensions
are observable or measurable) (Holmstrom 1979; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Feltham and
Xie 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995; Bol 2008). Incentive distortions arise because when difficult
to measure job dimensions are not incentivized, it encourages employees to focus their effort on
only incentivized dimensions (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). To mitigate this problem,
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managers can subjectively increase ratings of performance to incorporate effort that is not easily
quantified (Bol 2008). For example, a field study at an internal audit organization finds that
when the organization adopts a new performance evaluation system and managers perceive the
new objective indicators to be insufficient measures of performance, managers are likely to use
their knowledge of employees’ past performance and make upward adjustments (Woods 2012).

2.2.3 Costs of Subjectivity
Although there are many benefits of subjective performance evaluations in compensation
contracting, existing research has identified some costs associated with its use. The costs can
either originate from the managers’ use of subjective performance evaluations or from
employees’ reactions to managers’ use of subjective performance evaluations. For example,
managers can renege on their promises or can provide inaccurate assessments of performance
and employees can engage in influence activities or reduce effort because of the lack of certainty
in the measurement criteria (Prendergast and Topel 1993; Bol 2008).
An important cost of subjective evaluations in compensation contracting is that its use
can result in inaccurate evaluations of performance (Baker et al. 1988). Inaccurate subjective
performance evaluations can be defined as the “divergence from ‘true’ performance” (Bol 2008,
12). In some cases, inaccurate subjective performance evaluations can be harmful because they
reduce the effectiveness of incentives, which negatively affects productivity at the firm level
(Baker et al. 1988) and reduces effort or increases quitting at the employee level (Prendergast
and Topel 1993; Bol 2008). The subjective performance evaluation literature has identified two
types of inaccurate subjective performance evaluation: 1) intentional inaccurate subjective
performance evaluations (Moers 2005; Bol 2008, 2011; Bol et al. 2010; Du, Tang and Young
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2012; Bol, Kramer and Maas 2016; Du, Erkens, Young and Tang 2018), or 2) unintentional
inaccurate subjective performance evaluations (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher, Schulz and
Rotaru 2019; Bailey, Hecht, and Towry 2011; Lipe and Salterio 2000; Kramer and Maas 2020;
Bauch and Weibenberger 2020). In the subsections that follow, I will review research on both
types of inaccurate performance evaluations.

2.2.3.1 Intentional Inaccurate Subjective Performance Evaluations
The opportunity for managers to act in their own self-interest and make intentional
inaccurate evaluations is increased when evaluations are subjective. This is because in most
cases, the manager is responsible for making the evaluation but the organization (i.e., not the
manager) bears the cost of any inaccurate evaluations (Prendergast and Topel 1993; Prendergast
1999; Moers 2005; Bol 2008). As a result, the manager may act in their own self-interest and
consider personal benefits and costs in the evaluation of employees (Prendergast and Topel
1993; Bol 2008) and be influenced by reasons other than improving the compensation contract
(Woods 2012).
Prior research documents three types of managers’ preferences that may result in
inaccurate subjective performance evaluations: avoidance of high information gathering costs,
avoidance of providing negative feedback and favouritism (Bol 2008). Information gathering
costs refers to the time, effort and monetary costs incurred by the manager to obtain information
about employee performance (Bol 2011). Avoidance of providing negative feedback refers to
managers avoiding the costs (e.g., psychological costs) of delivering negative feedback to
employees (Prendergast and Topel 1993). Favouritism refers to when managers favour certain
employee(s) over other employees (Prendergast and Topel 1996; Ittner, Larcker and Meyer
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2003). When managers incorporate these preferences into subjective performance evaluations,
they can provide lenient (i.e., overinflated evaluations for all or certain employees) or centralized
(i.e., performance evaluations with little variation between employees) assessments of
performance (Moers 2005; Bol 2008; Bol et al. 2010; Bol et al. 2016).3
Moers (2005) provides archival evidence from performance evaluation data of 124
employees of a Dutch firm, regarding the existence of both the leniency and centrality biases.
When performance is evaluated and rewarded using either multiple objective measures or
subjective measures, both lenient and centralized ratings of performance are observed.
Additional archival research provides insights as to why subjective performance evaluations are
influenced by the leniency and centrality biases. Using performance evaluation data of a
financial services firm, two managerial preferences that are antecedents to intentional subjective
biases are identified: avoidance of high information-gathering costs and strong employeemanager relationships (Bol 2011). In the firm studied, both high information-gathering costs and
strong employee-manager relationships influence both the leniency and the centrality biases,
leading to inaccurate evaluations of subjective performance. Interestingly, the results also show
that performance evaluations affected by the leniency bias have positive consequences on
employee performance, whereas performance evaluations affected by the centrality bias have
negative consequences on employee performance. This difference is thought to be caused by the
perception that lenient evaluations are fairer, which has a positive effect on employees’
motivation and performance.
Two studies, based on archival performance evaluation data from the Chinese
government’s evaluation of Chinese state-owned enterprises (Du et al. 2012; Du et al. 2018),

3

An analytical model shows that even if managers prefer to provide accurate performance evaluations, the inherent
noise in subjective evaluations will result in the both the leniency and centrality biases (Golman and Bhatia 2012).
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provide field evidence of mangers’ intentional leniency biases. In their first study, the
researchers find that both bottom-up influence activities (e.g., the level of political connections
of the CFO and the geographic proximity to headquarters) and top-down favouritism (e.g., the
political rank of the firm) result in more favourable evaluations (Du et al. 2012). In their second
study, when a new indicator of performance replaced an old indicator of performance, evidence
of leniency bias is observed (Du et al. 2018).
One study examines centrality bias without consideration of the leniency bias. An
experimental study finds that information accuracy and transparency jointly influence managers’
intentional centrality bias in subjective evaluations of performance (Bol et al. 2016).
Interestingly, information accuracy leads to less centralized performance scores, but only in
settings where information transparency is high (i.e., when employees are aware of each other’s
performance).
Although the bulk of the existing literature examines leniency and centrality biases in expost evaluations of performance, one study provides evidence that the leniency bias could also
exists ex-ante as part of the target-setting process (Bol et al. 2010). In a setting where decreasing
the sales target of one store will increase the sales target of another store, this study shows
managers are more likely to subjectively set lower targets for stores whose managers have higher
hierarchal status.
Finally, a recent study using propriety data from a large multinational organization finds
that the use of calibration committees (i.e., a group of higher-level managers that review initial
subjective evaluations and make adjustments where necessary) can mitigate the leniency bias
(Demeré, Sedatole and Woods 2019). The study finds that calibration committees are likely to
make downward adjustments to initial subjective evaluations that are higher than average (i.e.,
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mitigating the leniency bias). That said, the study also shows that such adjustments increase the
centrality bias. A second study using archival performance evaluation data from a professional
services provider finds that both the leniency bias and the centrality bias can be reduced by
calibration committees (Grabner, Künneke and Moers 2020). In this research setting, the
calibration committee is also responsible for reviewing the evaluating supervisors’ performance.
Their study shows that because calibration committees will punish (via decreased performance
ratings) supervisors who are strategically lenient and reward (via a higher likelihood of
promotion) supervisors who are able to provide less compressed ratings, calibration committees
can mitigate the leniency and centrality biases.

2.2.3.2 Unintentional Inaccurate Subjective Performance Evaluations
Unintentional inaccurate assessments result when managers’ cognitive limitations
interfere with subjective evaluations of performance. Specifically, a cognitive limitation
“prevents managers from fully exploiting all information on employee performance” (Bol 2008,
12). Empirical research examines different factors which result in cognitive limitations that
affect subjective performance evaluations. Specifically, prior research examines cognitive
distortion (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher et al. 2019), the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic (Bailey et al. 2011), the outcome effect (Wong-on-Wing, Guo, Li and Yang 2007;
Long, Mertins and Vansant 2015), the common measures bias (Lipe and Salterio 2000; Libby,
Salterio and Webb 2004), the escalation of commitment bias (Kramer and Maas 2020) and the
likability bias (Bauch and Weibenberger 2020).
Cognitive distortion can arise when managers evaluate employees using both objective
and subjective indicators of performance (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher et al. 2019).
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Specifically, in experimental settings, when managers have knowledge of employees’ ratings on
an unrelated objective indictor of performance, it will spill over to managers’ assessments on the
subjective indicator of performance (Bol and Smith 2011; Fehrenbacher et al. 2019). This bias is
shown to be stronger when managers engage in a more intuitive (i.e., a less effortful cognitive
processing) decision mode as compared to a deliberate (i.e., a more effortful cognitive
processing) decision mode (Fehrenbacher et al. 2019).
Experimental research examines how the anchoring and adjustment heuristic is used
when both objective and subjective information is available in bonus pool allocations (Bailey et
al. 2011). In this study, 170 graduate students adopt the role of manager and make bonus
allocation decisions for fictitious employees. The results of the study provide evidence that,
rather than considering objective and subjective information holistically, managers adopt an
anchoring and adjustment approach where managers anchor on either objective, contractible
information or an equal split between employees in the bonus pool, and then insufficiently adjust
for subjective non-contractible information. As a result, the subjective non-contractible
information is not fully incorporated into bonus pool allocation decisions. That said, results of
this study also suggest that managers’ tendency to incorporate subjective non-contractible
information into subjective bonus pool allocations can be increased by endowing managers with
only partial discretion, as opposed to full discretion, over bonus pool allocations.4
Existing research defines the outcome effect to be when the knowledge of outcomes can
directionally influence evaluators’ judgments (Tan and Lipe 1997; Brazel, Jackson, Schaefer and
Stewart 2016). In a performance evaluation setting, the outcome effect can bias managers’

4

In their study, participants endowed with full discretion were responsible for making subjective allocations for the
full bonus pool whereas participants endowed with partial discretion were responsible for making subjective
allocations for half of the bonus pool while the other half was determined using non-subjective measures.
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subjective performance evaluations when knowledge of the outcome directionally influences the
evaluation (Wong-on-Wing et al. 2007; Long et al. 2015). Two experimental studies show that
the outcome effect can influence subjective performance evaluations. First, Long et al. (2015)
find that the outcome effect influences the extent to which managers incorporate subjective noncontractible information when they evaluate performance across multiple measures. Using 119
graduate student participants who assume the role of manager, this research provides evidence
that when weight allocations of multiple performance measures are specified, and when
subjective information is consistent with the valence of performance measure outcome, managers
are less likely to incorporate subjective non-contractible information into evaluations of
performance compared to when weight allocations are not specified. Second, Wong-on-Wing et
al.’s (2007) experiment examines the discrepancy of performance evaluations between raters and
ratees. They find that raters’ evaluations are more likely to be influenced by performance on
outcome rather than driver measures, compared to ratees’ evaluations.
An experimental study using 58 graduate students shows that the common measures bias
is likely to occur when employees are evaluated using multiple performance measures that
include a mix of measures that are common to all employees at the organization and unique to all
employees at the organization. Common measures bias refers to when managers have discretion
over how to weight common and unique measures, they often weight the common measures
more heavily than the unique measure (Lipe and Salterio 2000). Interestingly, a similarly
designed follow-up study shows that this bias can be reduced when managers are held
accountable for their evaluations or when provided with third-party assurance of the quality of
performance measures (Libby et al. 2004).
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An experimental study, using 97 student participants, provides evidence that escalation of
commitment bias is also a cognitive limitation that can influence managers when making
subjective performance evaluations (Kramer and Maas 2020). Specifically, when managers have
previously recommended an employee for promotion, they are more likely to subsequently
provide higher subjective ratings of their performance.
Finally, an experimental study of 111 students who assume the role of an evaluating
manager finds that when the likability bias (i.e., how likeable an employee is based on factors
that can either be related to their productive effort or factors unrelated to their productive effort)
is unintentional, a requirement of justifying evaluations induces more effortful evaluations,
mitigating the likeability bias. However, when the likeability bias is intentional, a requirement of
justifying evaluations induces a self-serving interpretation leading to even higher levels of the
likeability bias (Bauch and Weibenberger 2020).
In summary, subjectivity can be introduced into the compensation contract to improve its
ability to reward employees for their efforts. However, a review of existing research suggests
that in some cases, the use of subjectivity can lead to both intentional and unintentional
inaccurate evaluations of performance.

2.3 Attribute Substitution
In the previous section, I highlighted how existing research examines some heuristics and
biases in subjective performance evaluations. In my dissertation, I explore whether, and when,
the attribute substitution heuristic could influence subjective performance evaluations. In this
section I review existing research about the attribute substitution heuristic.
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2.3.1 Heuristics and Attribute Substitution
When judgments involve uncertainty, they can be informed by heuristic principles which
shorten judgmental operations by turning complex judgements into simple ones (Tversky and
Kahneman 1974). The attribute substitution heuristic is a combination of the representative
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) and availability (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) heuristics as it
occurs in situations where target attribute does not easily come to mind, but other related and
available attributes (i.e., the “heuristic attributes”) do (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). For
example, a question about the severity of weather in Canada may be difficult to answer.
Respondents may answer this question by quickly saying “cold.” To do this, they could have
considered only the weather during a particular month, such as January (i.e., a cold winter
month) as a representation of all weather in Canada.
In order for attribute substitution to occur, three conditions must be satisfied. First, the
target attribute must be relatively inaccessible. Second, the heuristic attribute must readily come
to mind. Third, the heuristic attribute must not be rejected by the rational System II thinking.5
Importantly, when the evaluator relies on the heuristic attribute to evaluate the target attribute,
systematic biases can result because these two attributes are not always the same (Kahneman and
Frederick 2002).

2.3.2 Attribute Substitution in Performance Evaluation
A stream of accounting research draws on attribute substitution to explain why proxies
are used in performance measurement to evaluate broad strategic objectives that are difficult to

5

System I and System II thinking are two different families of cognitive operations. System I is intuitive (e.g.,
automatic, effortless or associative) whereas System II is reflective (controlled, effortful and deductive) (Kahneman
and Frederick 2002).
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measure. The proxy is a performance metric that is used to simplify the judgment. It is
representative of the strategic objective, is quantifiable and easily comes to mind. When a proxy
performance metric is used to operationalize a strategic objective, managers and employees lose
sight of the underlying firm strategy, a phenomenon called surrogation (Choi, Hecht and Tayler
2012, 2013; Bentley 2019). This research provides examples of how attribute substitution may
be used in strategy evaluations, but it does not consider managers’ subjective evaluations of
employees. My thesis fills this gap by examining whether and how attribute substitution can
affect the subjective evaluation of the output quality of professional employees’ work.

2.3.3 Attribute Substitution Based on Duration
For attribute substitution to occur in the evaluation of subjective output quality, a
heuristic attribute must be easily available. In this section, I explore why duration may be used as
a heuristic attribute in evaluations of subjective output quality.
Research in psychology and other applied disciplines, such as marketing, recognize that
judgments of quality are difficult to determine, and therefore, apply theory grounded in heuristics
to consider evaluators’ judgment of quality (Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven and Alternmatt 2004;
Yeung and Soman 2007). When making ambiguous judgments of output quality, a psychology
study shows that effort (i.e., the time spent on the task) will have an influence on evaluators’
judgments of output quality (Kruger et al. 2004). In their study, participants evaluate the quality
of a painting and rate it higher when they think it took the artist 26 hours to complete compared
to when they think it took four hours to complete. Similarly, in a consumer behaviour study,
duration (i.e., the length of a service) is used as a basis to evaluate the value of a service and its
use is increased when duration is considered in relation to its price (Yeung and Soman 2007).
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The two studies above illustrate how duration can affect quality evaluations, outside of a
workplace setting. Within a workplace setting, existing research shows that duration can
influence both perceptions of employees and the determination of performance rewards. First,
when employees display passive facetime (defined as being seen at work during normal hours or
being seen at work outside of normal hours), they are viewed as more committed and
dependable. These are characteristics that interview respondents associate with being more
hardworking (Elsbach et al. 2010). Second, a field experiment at a Chinese travel agency shows
that when employees work at home as opposed to working in the office (i.e., they display less
facetime), they are less likely to earn a promotion reward (Bloom, Liang, Roberts and Ying
2015). Third, a meta-analysis of 140 studies examining predictors of career successes finds that
the number of hours that an employee works positively influences both increases in salaries and
promotions (Ng, Eby, Sorensen and Feldman 2005).
In summary, judgments of quality can be difficult for evaluators to determine and they
sometimes rely on heuristics to help simplify the judgment. I further explore attribute substitute
theory as a possible theory to explain how evaluators may make judgments of output quality in
subjective performance evaluations.

2.4 Subjectivity and Reward Purpose
In the preceding sections, I reviewed the role of subjectivity in performance evaluations
and how, in some cases, they can result in inaccurate evaluations of performance. Using attribute
substitution theory, I explored why duration may be used by evaluators in making subjective
evaluations of output quality. As my dissertation examines bonus rewards and promotion
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rewards, I build on this discussion in Section 2.4 by reviewing literature that examines how
bonuses and promotions are determined (at least in part) by using elements of subjectivity.
In Section 2.4.1, I describe how subjectivity might be used differently in bonus and
promotion reward decisions. In Section 2.4.2, I review research related to bonus rewards, and in
Section 2.4.3, I review research related to promotion rewards.

2.4.1 Bonus and Promotion Rewards
Bonus rewards are a typical financial incentive used by managers to motivate employees
(Bonner and Sprinkle 2002) and are often awarded on the basis of exceeding a performance
threshold for the current period (Prendergast 1999). The performance threshold can be
determined ex-ante using a formulaic approach, can be determined ex-post using a discretionary
approach or can be determined using a combination of both of these approaches (Bailey et al.
2011).
Promotions rewards serve two important functions to organizations; an incentive function
and a sorting function. They incentivize employees by motivating them to learn new skills that
will qualify them for a role that has higher pay, increased prestige and more responsibilities
(Prendergast 1993; Grabner and Moers 2015). Promotions rewards are the mechanism by which
employees move up the hierarchal ranks at an organization (Gibbs 1995). Therefore, only
employees with the right skills and abilities will earn a promotion, which allows managers to
effectively sort employees into roles that they are capable of doing (Baker et al. 1988; Gibbs
1995).
Promotion rewards differ from bonus rewards in several important ways. First, bonus
rewards do not require managers to match employees’ skills to requirements of their job level,
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whereas, when awarding promotions, managers should match the employees’ skills and abilities
to the job level they are best suited for (Baker et al. 1988). Second, bonuses are often considered
by evaluators over one period, which means that they motivate employees’ current period
performance only. Promotions differ because they are often considered by evaluators over a
longer horizon, which means they can motivate employees beyond the current period (Baker et
al. 1988). Third, bonuses are one-time, current period payments whereas promotions are often
associated with permanent salary increases (Gibbs 1995).
Employees can simultaneously be eligible for both bonus rewards and promotion rewards
(e.g., Balakrishnan, Drymiotes and Sivaramakrishnan 2019). A study of professional employees
at a technology firm shows that employees can be eligible for promotions and financial
incentives at the same time (Baik, Evans, Kim and Yanadori 2016). In other circumstances,
employees can be independently eligible for a bonus reward or a promotion reward. Some
studies examine the effects bonus rewards alone have on employee performance. For example,
employees at a call centre who are eligible to earn tournament style bonus rewards have a
tendency to become complacent when they are top performers and give up when they are bottom
performers (Berger, Klassen, Libby and Webb 2013). A second field study using compensation
data from a multi-national organization shows that when implicit incentives from earning a
promotion are weak (i.e., the likelihood of promotion is low), explicit incentives from receiving a
bonus are strong (Ederhof 2011). Other studies examine the effects of promotion rewards alone
on employee performance. For example, employees at a quick-service restaurant who are eligible
for a promotion allocate more effort to non-financial performance measures compared to
employees who are not eligible for a promotion (Campbell 2008).
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2.4.2 Bonuses as Rewards for Performance
A well-established stream of psychology research examines how bonuses are used to
reward objective performance measures. Bonus rewards are provided to recognize the
achievement of a goal or objective (Locke 2004). Several studies document the positive
performance effects of rewarding a cash bonus to employees that attain objective performance
goals (Locke and Latham 2002; Bonner, Hastie, Sprinkle and Young 2000; Bonner and Sprinkle
2002).
More recently, management accounting researchers examine how rewarding different
types of bonuses for the attainment of objective measures can influence performance. Some
studies examine how employees’ behaviours are affected when they are eligible to receive bonus
rewards. For example, a quasi-experiment using 570 financial services call centre employees
finds that when eligible to receive cash bonus rewards (as opposed to tangible non-cash rewards)
for goal attainment, employees are more likely to select difficult goals, which has a positive
effect on performance (Presslee, Vance and Webb 2013). Also, some studies examine how
objective measures are selected by managers in rewarding bonuses. An experimental study of
138 undergraduate students finds that lower ability individuals perform better on a decoding task
when managers select a goal that is based on their ability as opposed to when managers select a
goal that is common to all participants (Jeffrey, Schulz and Webb 2012).
While there is a significant amount of research that examines the use of objective
performance measures in rewarding bonuses, there is much less research that examines the use of
subjective performance measures in rewarding bonuses. Recent research in management
accounting has begun to explore how subjective performance evaluations for bonus rewards
affect employee performance. For example, an experimental study provides evidence that when
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ex-post goal adjustments are available to filter out unforeseen and uncontrollable events,
performance is improved for moderately set goals (Kelly, Webb and Vance 2015). A second
experimental study shows that in difficult work periods and when ex-post adjustments are
available to filter out negative uncontrollable events, superior-subordinate identity moderates the
relationship between the availability of an ex-post adjustment and expectancy of receiving a
reward, such that expectancy of the reward is higher when superior-subordinate identity is high
compared to when it is low (Burt, Libby and Presslee 2020). Furthermore, the study finds when
superior-subordinate identity is high there is a positive indirect effect of the availability of an expost adjustment on performance through reward expectancy. Further evidence from the field
shows that at a Chinese manufacturing firm, in a tournament setting, when subjectively
determined bonuses are rewarded to one department and subjectively determined penalties are
rewarded to another department, overall firm performance is not improved (Cai and Gallani
2017). In addition to examining how employees’ performance is affected by subjectivity, other
recent research examines how managers use subjectivity when determining bonus rewards. For
example, in an experiment where graduate students assume the role of a manager, the managers’
subjective adjustments to filter out the negative effects of an uncontrollable event were most
prevalent when the likelihood that the event will reoccur was low and the bonus pool was not
interdependent (i.e., their decision will not affect the bonus of allocations of other employees)
(Bol et al. 2015). A second example using field data of a large travel retailer shows that when expost subjective bonuses are available, managers set higher targets for their employees (Aranda,
Arellano and Davila 2019).
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2.4.3 Promotions as Rewards for Performance
In this section, I review existing research that examines how information might be used
differently to determine promotions and the general role of performance measures in promotion
decisions. Recent archival research provides evidence that organizations are using different
performance measures to evaluate employees’ current performance compared to evaluations of
their future potential (Deller 2018). The study shows that managers are able to provide different
evaluations of these two types of measures, but those divergences tend to decrease over time.
Existing research also provides evidence that performance measures are used differently when
employees are eligible for a promotion compared to when they are not eligible for a promotion
(Campbell 2008; Bol and Leiby 2018; Chan and Thornock 2019). First, non-financial measures
(such as customer satisfaction surveys) are more heavily weighted in the evaluation of lowerlevel managers at a fast-food retailer when they are promotion eligible than when they are not
(Campbell 2008). Second, experimental research finds that when professional employees are
promotion eligible, their engagement in consultative decision making has a more negative effect
on promotion prospect evaluations compared to when they are not promotion eligible (Bol and
Leiby 2018). Interestingly, this study finds that this phenomenon occurs because the manager
adopts a different cognitive schema to evaluate the subjective cue of consultative decision
making when the employees are promotion eligible compared to when they are not. Third,
experimental research also finds that the rating granularity of performance measures affects
subjective performance evaluations differently when employees are promotion eligible compared
to when they are not (Chan and Thornock 2019). Specifically, when employees are promotion
eligible, subjective performance evaluations are higher under a single-rating system (i.e.,
managers provide a single overall performance rating) compared to a multiple-rating system (i.e.,
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managers provide a single overall performance rating, but only after rating all individual aspects
of employees’ jobs). However, when employees are not promotion eligible, the granularity of the
rating system does not affect subjective performance evaluations.
Prior research also examines the role of current year performance evaluations in
promotion decisions (Grabner and Moers 2013; Demeré, Krishnan, Sedatole and Woods 2016;
Chan 2018), recognizing that current performance does not always provide perfect information
about employees’ suitability for promotion (Baker et al. 1988). In order to avoid promoting
employees to a level of incompetence, when making promotion decisions, managers must not
only consider how employees perform at their current level of employment but also whether they
have the right skills, experience and aptitude to perform well at the subsequent level of
employment (Baker et al. 1988). To assess such characteristics, promotions are typically
determined using a discretionary approach (Prendergast 1999). Certain characteristics, outside of
the current job performance, are important in promotability evaluations. For example, previous
challenging job experiences (De Pater, Van Vianed, Bechtoldt and Klehe 2009), employee
ability and motivation (O’Reilly and Chatman 1994), organizational citizenship behaviour (Hui,
Lam and Law 2000) and a proactive personality (Seibert, Crant and Kraimer 1999) are all factors
that matter in promotion evaluations.
Research in management accounting provides evidence about the role of current
performance measures in promotion evaluations. In a study of division managers, current
performance metrics, such as return on assets, are used to determine promotions (Cichello, Fee,
Hadlock and Sonti 2009). That said, there is evidence to suggest that when employees’ tasks
differ upon promotion, current performance evaluations become less important. For example,
managers at a multinational bank place less weight on current objective measures of performance
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in favour of subjective evaluations of employees’ ability (Grabner and Moers 2013). Further,
experimental research finds that the use of current performance evaluations can depend on
whether they are determined using relative performance information (Chan 2018). Specifically,
this study provides evidence that when tasks upon promotion require higher level ability and
workers are uncertain about the promotion rule, out of concerns of fairness that are salient in a
relative performance information environment, managers are more likely to promote the
employee with the higher level of current performance rather than the employee who is best
suited for the promotive task. Moreover, evidence from the field at an internal audit firm finds
that relative performance information is indeed used in promotion decisions, and its use leads to
an increase in performance (Demeré et al. 2016).
In summary, Section 2.4 Subjectivity and Reward Purpose shows that subjectivity is used
in the determination of both bonus rewards and promotion rewards and that it can be applied
differently when employees are eligible for promotion, compared to when they are not.

2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I first review the relevant literature that examines subjectivity in
performance evaluations and compensation contacting and explain how managers can make both
intentional and unintentional inaccurate subjective evaluations. I then describe the general role of
heuristic theory and its relationship to uncertain judgments of quality. This review suggests that
research outside of accounting provides evidence that judgments of quality are influenced by
factors that provide no relevant information about quality itself. Finally, I review research on the
role subjectivity plays in managers’ bonus and promotion decisions and highlight that subjective
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information is often incorporated differently in assessments of promotions versus bonuses. In
Chapter 3, I will examine this issue in further detail in the development of my hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I draw on attribute substitution theory to explain why work-day duration
may be used in evaluations of subjective output quality. I then use existing research to explain
why its use in the evaluations of subjective output quality might differ, depending on whether the
purpose of the performance reward is a bonus or a promotion. My objective is to identify
whether a contextual cue that provides no information about subjective output quality influences
its evaluation.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes professional employees.
Section 3.3 uses attribute substitution theory to explain why work-day duration may influence
evaluations of subjective output quality. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 develop predictions about the
relationship between work-day duration and bonus rewards and between work-day duration and
promotion rewards, when output quality is good. In Section 3.6, I develop predictions to examine
whether the effects persist when output quality is less than good. The chapter is summarized in
Section 3.7.

3.2 Professional Employees
In this study I focus on subjective performance evaluations of professional employees.
Professional employees are “non-executive employees with significant managerial or
professional experience who service in functions without specific responsibility for generating
sales or the overall performance of a major organizational unit, such as a division or the entire
firm” (Baik et al. 2016, 34). Importantly, professional employees are routinely evaluated using
subjective (rather than objective) performance measures because most of the professional
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employees’ work is difficult to evaluate objectively. In my research, I examine the subjective
measurement of the work produced by professional employees.

3.3 The Role of Work-Day Duration in Subjective Evaluations of Output Quality
Due to the subjective nature of the output quality evaluations, evaluators may have
difficulty making assessments because of uncertainty or vagueness. As noted in Chapter 2,
attribute substitution theory proposes that when a target attribute is difficult to judge, a heuristic
attribute is easily available, and because the heuristic attribute will not be rejected by System II
thinking, the heuristic attribute will be used to replace the target attribute in the individuals’
evaluation process (Kahneman and Frederick 2002).
In my study, I examine a setting where the target attribute is output quality and the
heuristic attribute is work-day duration. All three conditions necessary for attribute substitution
to occur (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) are satisfied. First, the target attribute (i.e., output
quality) is relatively inaccessible because there is no objective performance measure to evaluate
quality against. Second, the heuristic attribute readily comes to mind because work-day duration
(i.e., the average amount of time professional employees spend at work relative to other
professional employees) is easily observed and therefore should easily come to mind. Third,
given the well-established relationship of effort as a determinant of performance (e.g., Awasthi
and Pratt 1990; Hannan, McPhee, Newman and Tafkov 2013; Hecht et al. 2018; Bonner and
Sprinkle 2002), it is unlikely that the heuristic attribute (i.e., work-day duration) will be rejected
as a property of the target attribute (i.e., output quality).
An important assumption made in my study is that work-day duration is a heuristic
attribute that does not convey reliable information about the target attribute of output quality.
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Prior research suggests that visible commitment (i.e., staying late and working long hours) is a
job focused impression management strategy used by employees to influence their managers
(Singh, Kumra and Vinnicome 2002), but does not always have a positive effect (Ferris, Judge,
Rowland and Fitzgibbons 1994). Specifically, when employees engage in job-focused influence
tactics such as staying late and working long hours, it leads to lower levels of supervisor affect
resulting in lower evalautions of performance (Ferris et al. 1994). Normatively speaking,
evaluators should not allow work-day duration to influence their output quality evaluations
because there is no deterministic relationship between work-day duration and output quality.
Specifically, holding the quality of output constant, employees can work intensely and finish
their assigned tasks in a short amount of time or employees can work less intensely and finish
their tasks in a longer amount of time.
Managers adopt different schemas when evaluating contextual cues (such as work-day
duration) in subjective evaluations, depending on the purpose of the evaluation (Bol and Leiby
2018). To examine the influence of work-day duration on subjective evaluations, I examine two
different purposes of evaluation: bonus or promotion. I will discuss the joint effects of work-day
duration in bonus rewards in Section 3.4 and in promotion rewards in Section 3.5.

3.4 Work-Day Duration and Bonus Rewards
Prior research indicates that when employees display facetime at work (i.e., work-day
duration), they are viewed as more dependable and committed, which serves as a signal that they
could be more hardworking (Elsbach et al. 2010). If professional employees work shorter hours
compared to other professional employees, they may be perceived as less hardworking. This may
indicate to managers that professional employees are less deserving of a bonus if they work
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shorter hours compared to when they work the same duration as other employees. This is
because bonuses are intended to motivate and reward performance for the current period (Baker
et al. 1988; Prendergast 1999). When evaluating this output, the heuristic attribute of work-day
duration will likely replace the target attribute of output quality. Therefore, I propose that when
professional employees work a short work-day duration compared to other employees, managers
are likely to evaluate output quality as lower compared to professional employees who work an
equal work-day duration compared to other employees. Stated formally:
H1: When the performance reward is a bonus, managers’ evaluations of employees’
output will be lower when the employees’ work-day duration is shorter relative to other
employees than when the employees’ work-day duration is equal to other employees.
3.5 Work-Day Duration and Promotion Rewards
Promotion evaluations differ from bonus evaluations because they not only incentivize
employees (e.g., employees may be more likely to work hard in order to earn the pay raise,
prestige and status that accompany a change in job title) but also serve as a sorting tool (e.g.,
employees with specific individual characteristics are matched with the jobs of the next level)
(Baker et al. 1988; Prendergast 1993; Gibbs 1995).6 Research that examines the use of
subjectivity in performance evaluations primarily does so in settings where the purpose of the
evaluation is to assess current-period performance of employees and related bonus decisions
(e.g., Ederhof 2010; Bailey et al. 2011; Maas et al. 2012; Bol et al. 2015; Majerczyk and Thomas
2017; Arnold et al. 2018) rather than to make promotion decisions. Although performance
evaluation related to promotion has long been identified as an area where research is lacking

6

Similar to prior research (e.g., Chan 2018), my experiments examine a setting that does not define a promotion rule
(i.e., what skills are required for promotion). As such, I do not define what the promotion criteria is, nor do I define
what the promotive task will be.
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(Prendergast 1999; Bol 2008), research in this area is still scarce (exceptions include: Campbell
2008; Grabner and Moers 2013; Bol and Leiby 2018; Chan 2018; Chan and Thornock 2019).
Limited empirical research provides evidence that information is used differently in
promotion decisions compared to other purposes of performance evaluation (Campbell 2008;
Grabner and Moers 2013). These differences can occur because non-financial information is
given more weight in promotion decisions, as it provides incremental information about how
employees will perform at the next level (Campbell 2008). Alternatively, they can occur when
current performance is not an important determinant of performance after promotion, in which
case subjective indications of ability become much more relevant (Grabner and Moers 2013).
Recent research provides insight into how information is used differently in promotion decisions:
When incorporating informative non-contractible information into evaluations, managers rely on
different cognitive schemas to interpret the information, which results in different outcomes (Bol
and Leiby 2018). In their setting, different schemas are likely to occur because promotion
evaluations need to consider employees’ readiness for the next job level, whereas performance
assessments need only to consider employees’ contributions to their current role.
Building on this stream of research, I propose that relative work-day duration influences
the subjective evaluation of output quality in promotion decisions differently from bonus
decisions. When evaluators are making promotion decisions, they must consider how suitable
professional employees are for the requirements of the next level (Baker et al. 1988). To make
suitability assessments, qualitative characteristics are important in evaluations of promotability
(e.g., O’Reilly and Chatman 1994; Seibert et al. 1999; Hui et al. 2000; De Pater et al. 2009).
Therefore, a short work-day duration is likely to not only signal that employees are less
hardworking (a less desirable characteristic for promotability), it could also provide a positive
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signal that is related to their suitability for promotion. Specifically, professional employees who
display a shorter work-day duration relative to other employees and produce good quality work
may signal that they are more efficient compared to their workplace peers. This signal of
efficiency provides incremental information that professional employees may be suitable for
promotion in that efficient individuals are more likely to adapt to the next level of job (e.g., they
can quickly acquire new skills required). Provided that the heuristic attribute of work-day
duration replaces the target attribute of output quality, evaluators will provide more positive
subjective evaluations to these employees’ output compared to that of their workplace peers.
Stated formally:
H2: When the performance reward is a promotion, managers’ evaluations of output will
be higher when the employees’ work-day duration is shorter relative to other employees
than when the employees’ work-day duration is equal to other employees.

3.6 Moderate Quality Subjective Output
I further examine an important boundary condition identified in the development of
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. In the preceding sections, I examine the joint effects of workday duration and the purpose of the performance reward for good quality output. In this section, I
examine whether these effects will persist for moderate quality output. This boundary condition
is important to study because, in practice, managers often need to evaluate output that is of lesser
quality.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, when professional employees work a
short work-day duration and produce moderate quality output, they will be perceived as less
hardworking than their equal work-day duration peers. Being perceived as less hardworking will
negatively affect the evaluations of output quality, whether they are considered for a bonus
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reward or a promotion. Different from Hypothesis 2, however, when professional employees
work a short work-day duration and produce moderate quality output, they will not be perceived
to be more efficient than their equal work-day duration counterparts. As efficiency is an
important characteristic is promotion decisions, evaluations of output for short work-day
duration employees will not be higher compared to equal work-day duration employees. I
propose H3 in alternative form and H4 in null from as follows:
H3: When output quality is moderate and the performance reward is a bonus, managers’
evaluations of employees’ output will be lower when the employees’ work-day duration
is shorter relative to other employees than when the employees’ work-day duration is
equal to other employees.
H4: When output quality is moderate and the performance reward is a promotion,
managers’ evaluations of output will not be higher when the employees’ work-day
duration is shorter relative to other employees than when the employees’ work-day
duration is equal to other employees.
3.7 Summary
Based on existing theory and research from economics, psychology and accounting, this
chapter develops four hypotheses. The objective of this research is to examine whether the easily
observed, non-informative, work-day duration cue influences subjective evaluations of output
quality, depending on whether the evaluations are for the purpose of determining bonus rewards
versus promotion rewards.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHOD
4.1 Design Overview
I test my hypotheses by using two separate experiments. Both experiments employ a 2 x
2 between-participants design where I manipulate two levels of relative work-day duration (short
and equal) and two levels of reward purpose (bonus and promotion). The experiments only differ
by the quality of subjective output produced by a professional employee. Experiment One tests
the set of hypotheses presented in Section 3.4 Work-Day Duration and Bonus Rewards and 3.5
Work-Day Duration and Promotion Rewards, which examine subjective output of good quality.
Experiment Two tests the set of hypotheses presented in Section 3.6 Moderate Quality
Subjective Output, which examine subjective output of moderate quality.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 and 4.3 discuss details of the simulation
and the experimental design, respectively. Section 4.4 describes the dependent, independent and
other measured variables. This chapter concludes in Section 4.5.

4.2 Simulation Details
4.2.1 Task
Participants assume the role of a Supervising Manager at a consulting company. They
first read a short description that provides important background information. Specifically, they
read that the company they work for is a consulting firm that provides business advice to a wide
range of companies across the United States. They learn about two types of employees that work
at the company: Analysts and Supervising Managers. Analysts work directly with clients that
require business advice about a problem they are facing. The Analysts’ responsibility is to think
critically about the problem and summarize their thoughts in a detailed memo. Supervising
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Managers are responsible for evaluating the memo provided by an Analyst, revise it and send it
off to the client requesting business advice. After reading the background information,
participants are told that their main task as a Supervising Manager is to make an overall
evaluation of output quality of the memo. In order to ensure that participants understand the
required task, they complete a short comprehension quiz. Participants then make evaluations of
output quality and respond to several post-experimental and demographic questions. The
experimental procedures are shown in Figure 1.

4.2.2 Quality of the Memo
The memo the participants are asked to evaluate is a four-paragrah, approximately 450word response to a business problem about a new product launch.7 The memo represents the
subjective nature of the work prepared by professional employees because its quality is not easily
quantifiable or objectively measured. The only difference between the memo used in Experiment
One and Experiment Two is the quality of the Analysts’ work. The high-quality memo, used in
Experiment One, is a highly ranked (i.e., would earn a score of 6/6) GMAT essay response
provided in Learning Express’s Exam Success Guide (Chesla and Schultz 2007). The lower
quality memo is an adapted version of the same essay where the expression of ideas is not well
organized and in some cases does not use relevant supporting reasons and examples. To ensure
that the memo used in Experiment One is of good quality and that the memo used in Experiment
Two is of significantly lower quality, two validation tests are performed. The details of the
validation tests are presented in Section 5.3 Validation Tests.

7

The memo in Experiment One is 452 words and the memo in Experiment Two is 454 words.
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4.2.3 Participants
Participants in both experiments are online labour market participants (who have
professional working experience). Online labour market participants are considered to be highly
reliable (Farrell, Grenier and Leiby 2017) and allow researchers to access participants with
specific attributes (Leiby, Rennekamp and Trotman 2019). I recruit 156 working professionals in
Experiment One and 165 working professionals in Experiment Two.8
Participants in both experiments are recruited using Prolific. Prolific is a web-based
participant pool whose mission is to make trustworthy data more accessible (Prolific n.d.) and is
used by other researchers in accounting (e.g., Wynes 2018; Murphy, Wynes, Hahn and Devine
2020). The data quality from participants on Prolific is comparable to Amazon Mechanical Turk;
however, the participant pool is more diverse (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat and Acquisti 2017).
Similar to other accounting research studies, the use of online participants allows me to
pre-screen participants with specific experience (e.g., Wynes 2018; Brasel, Doxey, Grenier and
Reffett 2016), which effectively allows matching of the participants with the research question
(Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson 2002). Using Proflic’s pre-established filters I am able to draw
from a heterogeneous population to pre-screen and recruit participants who have supervisory
experience. This pre-screen is important because the experimental task requires participants to
put themselves in a supervisory role and previous supervisory experience allows them to better
adopt the role. In Prolific, I employ the following filter to pre-screen participants based on their

8

Originally, I recruit 200 working professionals in Experiment One and 200 working professionals in Experiment
Two. Of the 200 responses, I exclude from the main results data from 44 participants in Experiment One and 35
participants in Experiment Two. These participants are excluded if they do not have the requisite supervisory
experience or if they fail the reading comprehension checks. Analyses of the 44 excluded participants in Experiment
One and 35 excluded participants in Experiment Two are provided in Section 5.6.1 Excluded Participants.
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previous supervisory experience: “At work, do you have supervisory responsibilities? In other
words, do you have the authority to give instruction to subordinates?” I also pre-screen
participants to ensure they reside in North America and have not participated in any of my
previous studies that use the same task. A full list of the filters I use to pre-screen participants is
shown in Table 1. I address potential concerns that participants do not have the requisite
experience (i.e., did not answer Prolific’s pre-screen questions correctly) by asking follow-up
questions within my study that make it difficult for participants to fake their qualifications (Leiby
et al. 2019). For example, rather than asking directly “Do you have supervisory experience?” I
ask, “How many employees have you supervised?” A full list of the follow-up questions I ask is
shown in Table 1.

4.2.4 Participant Compensation
The experiment is expected to take no longer than 20 minutes to complete and
participants are awarded £2.00 upon completion of the study. Prolific requires that experimenters
pay participants no less than £5.00/per hour. When tasks are intrinsically motivating, prior
research provides guidance that online worker-participants should be paid a relatively higher flat
wage (Farrell et al. 2017). I set the wage at a rate of £2.00 for 20 minutes because it translates to
£6.00/hour, which is a wage that is higher than the minimum wage required by Prolific. I
incentivize participants to pay close attention for the full duration of the experiment by including
five attention checks scattered throughout the study (Chandler, Mueller and Paolacci 2014;
Oppenheimer, Meyvis and Davidenko 2009). Participants are able to earn an additional £0.10 per
attention check they answer correctly.
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4.3 Experimental Design
In both experiments, I employ a 2 x 2 between-participants design where I manipulate
two independent variables: work-day duration and reward purpose. Experiment One tests H1 and
H2 that examine the joint effects of work-day duration and reward purpose when subjective
output quality is good. Experiment Two tests H3 and H4 that examine the joint effects of workday duration and reward purpose when subjective output quality is moderate.

4.3.1 Qualtrics and the Experimental Instrument
My experiment is programmed in Qualtrics and the URL is distributed to participants in
Prolific’s online participant pool. Using Qualtrics’ randomizer feature, participants are randomly
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions: 1. Short work-day duration and bonus
reward, 2. Short work-day duration and promotion reward, 3. Equal work-day duration and
bonus reward, 4. Equal work-day duration and promotion reward. The experimental instrument
is shown in Appendix 1.

4.3.2 Work-Day Duration
The first independent variable is work-day duration (Work-Day Duration). Participants
are randomly assigned to evaluate the output quality of an employee that works either a short
work-day duration relative to their workplace peers or an equal work-day duration relative to
their workplace peers. As 9am–5pm is a standard work-day accepted by North American
standards, I describe a short work-day duration as working 9am–3pm, compared to workplace
peers who work 9am–5pm. Equal work-day duration is described as working 9am–5pm, which is
similar to workplace peers.
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The description of work-day duration is delivered to participants in two parts. The first
part highlights the actual work hours that the focal employee (the Analyst) typically works and
the second part highlights how many hours the Analyst works relative to their workplace peers.
First, when participants read the details of the experimental task, the hours the Analyst works is
described to them in words. In the short work-day duration conditions, participants read,
“Generally speaking, the Analyst is considered to be a good employee that will often arrive at
work at 9am and will leave for the day at 3pm.” In the equal work-day duration conditions,
participants read, “Generally speaking, the Analyst is considered to be a good employee that will
often arrive at work at 9am and will leave for the day at 5pm.” The bold font is added for
emphasis. Second, participants receive a picture of the employee time records for all five
employees (i.e., for the Analyst and their workplace peers). In the short work-day duration
conditions, they observe that the Analyst works different times relative to their place peers (i.e.,
the Analyst works 9am–3pm while other workplace peers work 9am–5pm). In the equal workday duration conditions, they observe that the Analyst works similar times relative to their
workplace peers (i.e., the Analyst works 9am–5pm while other workplace peers also work 9am–
5pm). The exact manipulation by condition is shown in Appendix 2.

4.3.3 Purpose of the Performance Reward
The second independent variable is the purpose of the performance reward (Purpose).
Participants are randomly assigned to evaluate the output quality of the Analyst that will help to
determine whether they will receive a bonus or a promotion reward. Similar to the work-day
duration independent variable, the description of the purpose of the reward is provided to
participants when they read the details of the experimental task. In the bonus conditions,
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participants read, “The evaluation you provide will help to determine the likelihood that the
Analyst will earn an annual bonus.” In the promotion conditions, participants read, “The
evaluation you provide will help to determine the likelihood that the Analyst will earn a
promotion.” The bold font is added for emphasis. The exact manipulation by condition is shown
in Appendix 2.

4.4 Dependent, Independent and Other Measured Variables
4.4.1 Subjective Evaluation of Output Quality
The dependent variable of interest is the subjective evaluation of output quality
(Subjective Quality). Subjective Quality is measured on a 100-point scale where zero corresponds
to “poor” and 100 corresponds to “excellent.” Participants are asked to do this in the following
way: “Your Task: Please rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo. Indicate your
evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.” Although I ask participants to
provide a single rating of Subjective Quality, to help participants make an informed evaluation
and to be consistent with prior research, I also provide participants with four criteria that, if
present, form a good quality response memo (Chan and Thornock 2019). Specifically, the four
criteria to consider in the determination of their overall rating of Subjective Quality are: “1. The
overall quality of ideas, 2. The organization, development and expression of ideas, 3. The use of
relevant and supporting reasons and examples and 4. Control over elements of standard written
English.” These four criteria are the criteria used to evaluate GMAT essays in practice. In my
study the ratings of these criteria were solicited after the overall rating of Subjective Quality is
provided to validate the dependent variable (Table 2, Panel A). I perform a bivariate correlation
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analysis shown in Table 2, Panel B. I find that across both experiments, all four measures
significantly correlate with the overall rating of quality (where all ρ > 0.55, p < 0.01).
4.4.2 Hardworking and Efficient Measurement
My theory suggests that work-day duration can signal that employees are hardworking.
To measure whether work-day duration signals the hardworking characteristic, I created the
statement “The employee is a hardworking employee” and asked participants to respond on a 7point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly
Agree.”9 To measure whether work-day duration can signal that employees are efficient,
participants respond to the following statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly
Agree.”10

4.4.3 Other Measured Variables
Research in psychology suggests that thinking styles (i.e., rational-analytic versus
experiential-intuitive) may influence individuals’ heuristic responses (Shiloh, Salton and Sharabi
2002). To ensure that the effects of my manipulations are not driven by individual differences in
thinking styles, I measure those individual differences using an adapted version of the RationalExperimental Inventory Scale (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj and Heier 1996). Specifically, I ask
participants ten questions on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree”
and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.” These individual differences are measured to

9

I use 7-point Likert scales because variance is maximized when the scale length is 7 points and all data points are
labelled (Eutsler and Lang 2015). I use a scale with a range from -3 to +3 in order to ensure the there is a midpoint
and the scale is perceived as bipolar (i.e., participants either agree or disagree) (Schwarz, Knäuper, Hippler, NoelleNeumann and Clark 1991).
10
A discussion of hardworking and efficient is presented in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
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understand whether participants’ thinking style may explain their use of work-day duration. The
questions are shown in Appendix 3 and the results are shown in Section 5.7 Other Measured
Variables.

4.4.4 Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and Participants’ Attention Checks
Similar to previous research that uses online labour market participants, I ensure
participants attend to the experimental task by scattering incentivized attention checks
throughout the study (e.g., Wynes 2018; Brasel et al. 2016). Specifically, I ask participants two
questions related to important details of the experimental manipulation (Chandler et al. 2014).
After reading about the work-day duration manipulation, I also ask participants to confirm the
hours that the professional employee works, and after reading about the reward purpose
manipulation, I ask participants to confirm what the purpose of the quality evaluation is. These
incentivized attention checks increase statistical power by reducing noise (Libby and Thorne
2017).
To ensure participants pay close attention to the response memo (the main part of the
experimental task), I ask them to recall factual information discussed in the memo (Chandler et
al. 2014). Two questions are asked after I collect the participants’ responses on the dependent
variable regarding the response memo. These questions reflect important details of the response
memo provided. For example, I ask participants to identify the main argument made in the
response memo.
To help validate the quality of the data, I ask one instructional attention check question in
the middle of the study that specifically measures whether participants are reading the
instructions carefully (Brandon, Long, Loraas, Mueller-Phillips and Vansant 2014; Oppenheimer
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et al. 2009). This question simply requires participants to follow the instructions and select a
specific answer choice (i.e., selecting answer choice c).
The above questions are shown in Appendix 4, and related results are reported in Section
5.6 Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and Participants’ Attention Checks.

4.4.5 Participants’ Perceptions of the Response Memo
To guard against perceptions about the simulation task influencing the experimental
results, participants are asked on a 7-point Likert scale (where -3 corresponds to “Strongly
Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree”) whether they enjoyed reading the memo and
the topic of the memo, the writing style of the Analyst and whether they have a strong opinion
about the business issue. Related results are shown in Section 5.4 Participants’ Perceptions of the
Response Memo.

4.5 Summary
In two experiments, I employ a 2 x 2 between-participants design, to test whether relative
work-day duration and the purpose of the performance reward affect Supervising Managers’
evaluations of subjective output of good and moderate quality. The next chapter presents the
results of both experiments.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I provide the results of Experiment One and Experiment Two. I begin in
Section 5.2 by reporting the demographic information about the participants. Section 5.3 reports
on the validation tests and Section 5.4 reports on participants’ perceptions of the response
memos. My test of the hypotheses is performed in Section 5.5. Specifically, Section 5.5.1
examines how Work-Day Duration and the Purpose of the performance reward affect subjective
evaluations of good output quality (Hypotheses 1 and 2). Whereas Section 5.5.3 examines how
Work-Day Duration and the Purpose of the performance reward affect subjective evaluations of
moderate output quality (Hypotheses 3 and 4). Section 5.6 reports the results of the task
understanding, reading comprehension and participants’ attention checks, and Section 5.7 reports
other measured variables. The chapter concludes in Section 5.8.
5.2 Demographic Information about Participants
I recruit 156 participants in Experiment One and 165 participants in Experiment Two.11
On average, participants are 36.31 (Experiment One) and 37.27 (Experiment Two) years old,
have an average of 14.23 (Experiment One) and 15.94 (Experiment Two) years of work
experience, and have supervised 24.70 (Experiment One) and 44.13 (Experiment Two)
employees. In addition, 93% (Experiment One) and 92% (Experiment Two) have not taken the

11

I initially recruit 200 participants in Experiment One and 200 participants in Experiment Two. In the formal tests
of my hypotheses, I exclude 44 participants in Experiment One and 35 participants in Experiment Two for not
having the requisite experience or for failing to pay sufficient attention during the study. A full analysis of excluded
participants is shown in Section 5.6.1 Excluded Participants. In the rest of this chapter, my analysis includes the
responses from 156 participants in Experiment One and 165 participants in Experiment Two.
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GMAT, and 33% (Experiment One) and 51% (Experiment Two) are female. Participant
background information is shown in Table 3.
To check the effectiveness of randomization, I perform a multivariate analysis of
covariance (MANOVA) for continuous variables (age, work experience, number of supervised
employees and education) and a cross-tabulation analysis for non-continuous variables (gender
and previous GMAT experience), between experimental conditions. Results of the MANOVA
(untabulated) show that age, work experience, number of supervised employees and education do
not significantly differ between conditions for Work-Day Duration (F = 0.31, p = 0.87,
Experiment One; F = 0.24, p = 0.91, Experiment Two), Purpose (F = 0.81, p = 0.52, Experiment
One; F = 1.45, p = 0.22, Experiment Two) and the interaction of Work-Day Duration and
Purpose (F = 1.57, p = 0.18, Experiment One; F = 1.24, p = 0.30, Experiment Two)12. Results of
the cross-tabulation analysis (untabulated) shows that gender does not differ between conditions
for Work-Day Duration (χ²(1) = 0.32, p = 0.57, Experiment One; χ²(2) = 2.87, p = 0.24,
Experiment Two) or Purpose (χ²(1) = 1.05, p = 0.31, Experiment One; χ²(2) = 3.49, p = 0.18,
Experiment Two). Results (untabulated) also show that previous experience with the GMAT
does not differ between conditions for Work-Day Duration (χ²(1) = 0.72, p = 0.40, Experiment
One; χ²(1) = 0.38, p = 0.54, Experiment Two) or Purpose (χ²(1) = 0.34, p = 0.56, Experiment
One; χ²(1) = 0.16 p = 0.69, Experiment Two). Thus, randomization appears to be effective.
For both experiments, I perform follow-up analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests where
age, work experience, number of supervised employees and education are dependent variables
and Work-Day Duration and Purpose are independent variables. In Experiment One, results

12

One-tailed p-values are used for directional predictions and two-tailed p-values are used for non-directional
predictions. In the text, one-tailed p-values are noted as such and two-tailed p-values are reported simply as pvalues.
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(untabulated) show for all dependent variables, the effect of Work-Day Duration, Purpose and
the interaction of Work-Day Duration is not significant (where all F < 1.70 and all p > 0.19)
with the exception of the interaction of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on the number of
supervised employees (F = 3.46, p = 0.07). To address this, I perform an analysis of covariance
(ANCOVA) with Subjective Quality as the dependent variable, Work-Day Duration and Purpose
as the independent variables and the number of supervised employees as a covariate, shown in
Table 4, Panel A. I find, when the number of supervised employees is included as a single
covariate in the test of hypotheses, statistical inferences do not differ. Specifically, the interaction
between Work-Day Duration and Purpose remains significant (F = 3.00, p = 0.09). Therefore, I
exclude it as a covariate in the test of hypotheses.
In Experiment Two, results (untabulated) of the follow-up ANOVA tests indicate that for
all dependent variables the effect of Work-Day Duration, Purpose and the interaction of WorkDay Duration and Purpose is not significant (where all F < 1.75 and all p > 0.19) with the
exception of the effect of Purpose on age (F = 4.07, p = 0.05) and work experience (F = 3.34, p =
0.07). To address this, I perform an ANCOVA with Subjective Quality as the dependent variable,
Work-Day Duration and Purpose as the independent variables, and age and work experience as
covariates, shown in Table 4, Panel B. I find, when age and work experience are included as
covariates in the test of hypotheses, statistical inferences do not differ. Specifically, the
interaction between Duration and Purpose remains insignificant (F = 1.86, p = 0.17). Therefore,
I exclude them both as covariates in the test of hypotheses.13

13

I also perform a supplemental regression analysis using the two dichotomous variables (gender and experience
with the GMAT), to verify that the results do not differ when they are included as control variables. In the
regression, Subjective Quality is the dependent variable, Work-Day Duration and Purpose are the independent
variables and gender and experience with the GMAT are control variables. The regression analysis shows the
coefficients in Experiment One for gender (b = 0.01, t = 0.17, p = 0.87, untabulated) and experience with GMAT (b
= 0.05, t = 0.59, p = 0.56, untabulated) and those in Experiment Two for gender (b = 0.01, t = 0.16, p = 0.87,
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5.3 Validation Tests
I run two validation tests. The purpose of the first validation test is to identify output that
is of good quality. This validation test relates only to the response memo in Experiment One and
is administered prior to the first experiment. During this validation test, I pre-test four different
response memos on various different topics. I recruit 99 online labour market participants via
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants are paid USD$3.50 for 30 minutes of work. They are
filtered based on their education level (must have a bachelor’s degree or higher), must have a
HIT approval rate of 95% or higher and they must reside in North America. Originally, I recruit
147 participants. To ensure that the quality of responses is acceptable, I eliminate observations
based on two criteria. First, participants must have answered at least one attention check
correctly. Second, participants must have spent a realistic amount of time (i.e., at least ten
minutes) completing the study.14
Participants are required to evaluate the output quality for two out of four response
memos. Participants are randomly assigned to one of 12 different conditions. Six conditions are
required to exhaust all possible combinations of two response memos, which is then doubled to
12 conditions to manipulate the order of the two memos. However, as participants in my formal
experiments evaluate the output quality of a single employee, I only examine the scores assigned
to the first response memo that all participants in the validation test observe. By examining the
first response memo observed, I eliminate effects that may result from joint evaluations (i.e.,

untabulated) and experience with the GMAT (b = 0.03, t = 0.34, p = 0.74, untabulated) are not significant. The
coefficients in Experiment One for the interaction between Duration and Purpose remain significant (b = -0.76, t = 2.15, p = 0.03, untabulated) and the coefficients in Experiment Two for the interaction between Duration and
Purpose remain insignificant (b = -0.44, t = -1.23, p = 0.22, untabulated).
14

31 participants were eliminated because they did not answer at least one attention check correctly. An additional
17 participants were eliminated because they did not spend at least 10 minutes completing the study.
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comparing the second response memo to the first response memo). Means and standard
deviations of the scored Subjective Quality are shown in Table 5. The memo that scored the
highest mean is response memo two (m = 91.11, s.d. = 8.08) which is significantly higher than
response memo one (m = 81.09, s.d. = 13.07, t = 3.31, p < 0.01, untabulated), response memo
three (m = 81.26, s.d. = 10.97, t = 3.65, p < 0.01, untabulated) and response memo four (m =
78.65, s.d. = 14.52, t = 3.88, p < 0.01, untabulated). In addition to earning the highest mean
score, response memo two also presents a realistic business problem. Therefore, I select response
memo two to be used in Experiment One.
The second validation test is administered subsequent to Experiment One and prior to
Experiment Two. This validation test is to ensure that the response memo in Experiment One is
of significantly higher quality (i.e., good) than the response memo in Experiment Two (i.e.,
moderate). I recruit 99 participants on Prolific to complete this validation test. To ensure that the
participants in the validation test are comparable to those in the formal experiment, I pre-screen
participants based on their highest level of education completed (a bachelor’s degree or higher),
their country of residence (Canada or the United States) and whether they had participated in a
previous study with the same experimental task. Further, participants are pre-screened on the
basis that they did not have managerial experience.15 This filter is applied to ensure I did not tap
into the limited participant pool of participants with supervisory experience available for the
formal study. As these participants are required to hold a bachelor’s degree or higher, I believe
they have the requisite skills to make basic judgments of quality outside of a workplace setting.
15

Although I pre-screened participants who did not have managerial experience in this validation test, some
participants indicated that they had previous experience evaluating employee performance. Specifically, 83% of
respondents have provided a performance evaluation for between 0 and 5 employees, 6.1% have provided a
performance evaluation for between 6 and 10 employees, 3% have provided a performance evaluation for between
10 and 15 employees and 7% have provided a performance evaluation for greater than 15 employees. I examine
whether this performance evaluation experience influences their evaluations of the response memo, and find that it
does not (F = 0.17, p = 0.68, untabulated).

53

Using the same criteria as in the formal tests, participants assume the role of a
Supervising Manager and are required to evaluate response memos of two Analysts. One
response memo is of good quality and the other response memo is of moderate quality. The order
of presentation is manipulated, and 51 participants receive the good quality memo first and 48
participants receive the moderate quality memo first. To eliminate the effects of joint evaluations
(i.e., comparing the second response memo to the first response memo), I compare the quality
evaluation scores of participants who receive the good quality memo first to the quality
evaluation scores of participants who receive the moderate quality memo first. Descriptive
statistics are shown in Table 6, Panel A. The average score reported on the good quality response
was 82.02 (s.d. = 13.46) and the average score on the moderate quality response was 72.00 (s.d.
= 18.73). I perform an ANOVA to determine whether the two average scores are significantly
different. Results are shown in Table 6, Panel B and indicate that the two response memo scores
are significantly different from each other (F = 9.43, p < 0.01). From this validation test, I
conclude that the response memo provided in Experiment One is significantly better (i.e., is of
good quality) than the response memo provided in Experiment Two (i.e., is of moderate quality).

5.4 Participants’ Perceptions of the Response Memo
As described in Section 4.4.5 Participants’ Perceptions of the Response Memo,
participants are asked four questions about their perceptions of the simulation on a 7-point Likert
scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
Participants’ perceptions about the response memo are shown in Table 7 (Experiment One) and
Table 8 (Experiment Two). I perform a one-sample t-test to examine whether participants
perceptions differed from the neutral point of zero shown in Table 7, Panel C (Experiment One)
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and Table 8, Panel C (Experiment Two). Participants in Experiment One enjoyed reading the
response memo (m = 1.78, s.d. = 1.03, t = 21.6, p < 0.01), thought the Analyst had a good
writing style (m = 1.54, s.d. = 1.18, t = 16.40, p < 0.01), enjoyed the topic (m = 1.63, s.d., = 1.06,
t = 19.28, p < 0.01), and had a strong opinion about the problem/issue presented (m = 0.37, s.d. =
1.64, t = 2.78, p = 0.01). Participants in Experiment Two enjoyed reading the response memo (m
= 0.25, s.d. = 1.72, t = 1.91, p = 0.06) and thought the Analyst had a good writing style (m =
0.75, s.d. = 1.45, t = 6.66, p < 0.01) but did not have a strong opinion about the problem/issue
presented (m = -0.34, s.d. = 1.54, t = -2.82, p = 0.01) and were neutral about their perceptions of
the topic (m = -0.03, s.d. = 2.00, t = -0.19, p = 0.85). It is likely that participants in Experiment
One reported higher scores than in Experiment Two because the output quality in Experiment
One was superior (i.e., it was a more coherent and easier to follow passage of writing).
As these questions are all correlated (see Table 7, Panel B, Experiment One and Table 8,
Panel B, Experiment Two), I use a MANOVA to analyse whether these four perception variables
differ between experimental conditions. In Experiment One, I find that these four variables do
not differ between conditions for Work-Day Duration (F = 0.50, p = 0.73, untabulated) or
Purpose (F = 0.59, p = 0.67, untabulated). However, I do find that the interaction of Duration
and Purpose to be significant (F = 2.96. p = 0.02, untabulated). This suggests that at least one of
the four perception variables is affected by the experimental manipulations. A test of between
subjects effects indicates that Enjoy Topic (“I enjoyed reading about the topic in the memo”) is
marginally significantly influenced by the interaction of Duration and Purpose (F = 7.15, p =
0.08, untabulated).16 I subsequently perform an ANCOVA with Subjective Quality as the

16

Specifically, participants in the bonus reward conditions enjoyed the topic of the response memo less when the
Analyst worked a short duration (m = 1.44; s.d. = 1.08) compared to an equal duration (m = 1.74; s.d. = 1.03). In
contrast, participants in the promotion conditions enjoyed the topic of the response memo more when the Analyst
worked a short duration (m = 1.95; s.d. = 0.73) compared to an equal duration (m = 1.36; s.d. = 1.25).
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dependent variable, Work-Day Duration and Purpose as the independent variables and Enjoy
Topic as the covariate. When Enjoy Topic is included as a covariate, the interaction between
Duration and Purpose is no longer significant (F = 1.18, p = 0.28, untabulated). This change of
inference could be caused by a spillover effect. Specifically, since Enjoy Topic is measured after
the dependent variable, the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable could
spill over to Enjoy Topic, causing a correlation between them (ρ = 0.49, p < 0.01). This spillover
effect would weaken the effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable while
controlling for Enjoy Topic.
In Experiment Two, the MANOVA shows that the four perception variables do not differ
between conditions for Work-Day Duration (F = 1.46, p = 0.22, untabulated), Purpose (F = 1.34,
p = 0.26, untabulated) or the interaction of Work-Day Duration and Purpose (F = 1.81, p = 0.13,
untabulated).

5.5 Main Results – Evaluation of Subjective Output
5.5.1 Test of Hypotheses 1 & 2
In this section, I analyse the set of hypotheses tested in Experiment One which examine
good quality subjective output. The dependent variable of interest is participants’ overall ratings
of Subjective Quality. I first describe the descriptive statistics for Subjective Quality by condition
shown in Table 9. I then describe the results of the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shown in
Table 10, Panel A and the results of the simple effects shown in Table 10, Panel B.
When the Purpose of the evaluation is a bonus, average ratings of Subjective Quality are
lower when Work-Day Duration is short (m = 84.82; s.d. = 8.10) compared to when Work-Day
Duration is equal (m = 87.89; s.d. = 9.33). When the Purpose of the evaluation is a promotion,
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average ratings of Subjective Quality are higher when Work-Day Duration is short (m = 87.12;
s.d. = 8.98) compared to when Work-Day Duration is equal (m = 82.93; s.d. = 12.89).
Together, H1 and H2 predict how short (versus equal) Work-Day Duration influences
evaluations of Subjective Quality, depending on whether the evaluation is used to determine a
bonus (H1) or a promotion (H2). To formally evaluate these two hypotheses, I use an ANOVA
test and follow up with simple effect tests shown in Table 10. Taken together, H1 and H2 predict
an interaction effect, such that the effect of short Work-Day Duration will depend on the Purpose
of the performance evaluation. The significant interaction between Work-Day Duration and
Purpose (F = 5.00, p = 0.03, Table 10, Panel A) provides evidence that the effect of Work-Day
Duration on evaluations of Subjective Quality depends on the Purpose of performance
evaluations. There are no significant main effects for Work-Day Duration (F = 0.12, p = 0.73,
Table 10, Panel A) or Purpose (F = 0.68, p = 0.41, Table 10, Panel A). The follow-up simple
effect tests further show that, consistent with H1, when short Work-Day Duration professional
employees are eligible for a bonus, Subjective Quality ratings are marginally lower compared to
equal Work-Day Duration employees (t = 1.29, p = 0.10, one-tailed, Table 10, Panel B).
Consistent with H2, when short Work-Day Duration professional employees are eligible for a
promotion, Subjective Quality ratings are higher compared to equal Work-Day Duration
professional employees (t = 1.90, p = 0.03, one-tailed, Table 10, Panel B). The results of H1 and
H2 are also presented in a graphic form in Figure 2.

5.5.2 Supplemental Tests of Hypotheses 1 & 2
In the development of H1 & H2, I theorize that when the performance reward is a bonus
or a promotion, short duration professional employees will be perceived as less Hardworking and
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not going above and beyond what is required. In Section 4.4.2 Hardworking and Efficient
Measurement, I describe the statement used to measure Hardworking. Descriptive results of
Hardworking are shown in Table 11, Panel A. When the performance reward is a bonus, short
duration employees are perceived as less hardworking (m = 1.29; s.d = 1.23) than equal duration
employees (m = 2.18; s.d = 0.73). When the performance reward is a promotion, short duration
employees are also perceived as less hardworking (m = 1.38; s.d = 1.23) than equal duration
employees (m = 1.95; s.d = 0.85). There is a significant difference (F = 19.57, p < 0.01, Table
11, Panel B) in the mean Hardworking score for short Work-Day Duration (m = 1.34; s.d = 1.22)
as compared to equal Work-Day Duration (m = 2.06; s.d = 0.80) across Purpose conditions.
Therefore, I find preliminary evidence to support my theory that in both bonus and promotion
decisions, short Work-Day Duration will have a negative influence on the evaluation of
Subjective Quality because of the perception that they are less Hardworking.
In the development of H2, I also theorize that when the performance reward is a
promotion, short Work-Day Duration professional employees will be perceived as more
efficient. Descriptive results of Efficient are shown in Table 12, Panel A. There is a significant
difference in the mean Efficient score for short Work-Day Duration (m = 2.19; s.d. = 0.74) as
compared to equal Work-Day Duration (m = 1.76; s.d. = 0.71) when the performance reward is a
promotion (t = 2.20, p = 0.02, one-tailed, Table 12, Panel C). Therefore, I find evidence to
support my theory that in promotion decisions, short Work-Day Duration will have a positive
influence on the evaluation of Subjective Quality because of perceptions of Efficient.
Interestingly, when the performance reward is a bonus reward, short Work-Day Duration
professional employees are not viewed as more efficient; rather, they are viewed as less efficient
(mean = 1.79; s.d. = 0.88) compared to equal duration professional employees (mean = 2.11; s.d.
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= 0.89) and the difference is not significant (t = 1.48, p = 0.14, Table 12, Panel C). I do not make
any a priori predictions on how perceptions of Efficient will affect evaluations of output quality
when the purpose of the reward is a bonus in the development of H1. That said, this result could
be because Efficient is not an important characteristic in bonus decisions, and when Work-Day
Duration is short, negative perceptions of hardworking spill over into perceptions of Efficient.
To further examine the relationship between Work-Day Duration, Hardworking, Efficient
and Subjective Quality, I perform a multi-group path analysis similar to Figure 3. I first divide
participants into two groups by Purpose: bonus (n = 72) and promotion (n = 84). The error terms
associated with Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to covary, and all path coefficients are
allowed to differ between groups.17 The model fit statistics indicate that the data fits this
unconstrained model well (Kline 2015). Specifically, the chi-square of the model is insignificant
(χ²(2) = 3.32, p = 0.19), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is 0.07, the
Comprehensive Fit Index (CFI) is 0.99, and the Normed Fit Index (NFI) is 0.98. As the data fits
the unconstrained model well, I continue my analysis to examine whether perceptions of WorkDay Duration influence Hardworking and Efficient differently, and whether Hardworking and
Efficient influence Subjective Quality differently, depending on the purpose of the performance
evaluation.
To understand whether the relationships between variables are different, depending on
the Purpose of the performance evaluation, I first compare the fully unconstrained model against
the fully constrained model where all path coefficients are constrained to be the same between

17

When the Purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion), the correlation between the two error
terms is 0.77 (0.57), suggesting that overall the two characteristics of the evaluated employee are positively
correlated. This finding is consistent with research that examines the halo effect; the phenomenon that arises when
an evaluator uses a global evaluation to influence evaluations of individual attributes of a person (e.g., Nisbett and
Wilson 1977).
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the bonus and the promotion groups. The constrained model yields a significantly worse fit:
(Δχ²(4) = 13.40, p = 0.01, untabulated), suggesting that at least one of the path coefficients
depends on whether the Purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus or a promotion.
I theorize that whether the Purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus or a
promotion, short Work-Day Duration employees will be perceived as less Hardworking.
Therefore, I do not expect that the coefficients between Work-Day Duration and Hardworking
and Hardworking and Subjective Quality will be different between the bonus and promotion
conditions. As expected, the chi-square difference test, comparing the unconstrained model and a
partially constrained model where these two paths are constrained to be the same between
groups, suggests that the path coefficients are not statistically different from each other (Δχ²(2) =
4.18, p = 0.12, untabulated).
When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a promotion, I theorize that short
duration employees will be perceived as more Efficient, which will result in higher evaluations of
Subjective Quality. I expect the coefficient between Work-Day Duration and Efficient to be more
negative (i.e., when duration decreases, participants will perceive the employee to be more
efficient) and the coefficient between Efficient and Subjective Quality to be greater (i.e., Efficient
is more important in evaluating the output quality of the employee’s work) in the promotion
conditions than in the bonus condition. As expected, the chi-square difference test, comparing
the unconstrained model and a partially constrained model where this path is constrained to be
the same between groups, suggests that the path coefficients are statistically different from each
other (Δχ²(2) = 12.21, p < 0.01).
Collectively, the results show that the optimal model is one where the path coefficient
between Work-Day Duration and Hardworking and that between Hardworking and Subjective
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Quality are constrained to be the same between groups while the path coefficients between
Work-Day Duration and Efficient and between Efficient and Subjective Quality are allowed to
vary between groups (χ²(4) = 7.50 (p = 0.11), RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96). The fit
of this model is not significantly different from the unconstrained model (Δχ²(2) = 4.18, p = 0.12,
untabulated). All standardized path coefficients for this optimal model are shown in Figure 3 and
Table 13.
As shown in Figure 3 and Table 13, the coefficients between Work-Day Duration and
Hardworking (β = 0.35, SE = 0.16, p < 0.001), and Hardworking and Subjective Quality (β =
0.38, SE = 0.79, p < 0.001) in the bonus condition are similar to the coefficients between WorkDay Duration and Hardworking (β = 0.33, SE = 0.17, p < 0.001), and Hardworking and
Subjective Quality (β = 0.29, SE = 0.79, p < 0.001) in the promotion condition. The coefficient
between Work-Day Duration and Efficient is more negative in the promotion conditions (β = 0.20, SE = 0.18, p = 0.05) than in the bonus condition (β = 0.11, SE = 0.17, p = 0.25), and the
coefficient between Efficient and Subjective Quality is greater in the promotion condition (β =
0.37, SE = 1.23, p < 0.001) than in the bonus condition (β = 0.24, SE = 1.17, p = 0.05).
In summary, my results suggest that Work-Day Duration influences Subjective Quality,
depending on whether the nature of the performance evaluation is a bonus or a promotion. The
subsequent path analysis provides evidence that whether the purpose of the performance
evaluation is a bonus or promotion when Work-Day Duration increases, employees are perceived
as more hardworking and, in turn, this positively influences the evaluations of Subjective
Quality. However, only when the purpose of the performance evaluation is a promotion but not
when it is a bonus, when Work-Day Duration decreases, employees are viewed as more efficient,
which in turn positively influences the evaluations of Subjective Quality.
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5.5.3 Test of Hypotheses 3 & 4
In this section, I analyse the set of hypotheses tested in Experiment Two which examine
moderate quality subjective output. Consistent with Experiment One and the test of H1 and H2,
the dependent variable of interest is participants’ overall rating of Subjective Quality. Table 14
presents descriptive statistics for Subjective Quality by condition. When the Purpose of the
evaluation is a bonus, average ratings of Subjective Quality are lower when Work-Day Duration
is short (m = 62.61; s.d. = 31.57) compared to when Work-Day Duration is equal (m = 72.07;
s.d. = 17.91). When the Purpose of the reward is a promotion, average ratings of Subjective
Quality are similar whether Work-Day Duration is short (m = 63.50; s.d. = 24.11) or is equal (m
= 63.91; s.d. = 22.35). This pattern suggests that among the four conditions, the average rating of
Subjective Quality is only higher when Work-Day Duration is equal, and the Purpose of the
reward is a bonus.
Together, H3 and H4 examine whether short Work-Day Duration influences evaluations
of Subjective Quality differently, depending on the purpose of the performance reward, for
moderate output quality. I evaluate these two hypotheses using an ANOVA test and follow up
with a contrast test and simple effect test. Table 15, Panel A, presents the results from the
ANOVA where Subjective Quality is the dependent variable, and Work-Day Duration and
Purpose are the independent variables. It shows that the interaction of Work-Day Duration and
Purpose is not significant (F = 1.42, p = 0.24). The default contrast weights of (+1, -1, -1, -1) are
more suitable for testing a disordinal interaction as predicted in Experiment One (Buckless and
Ravenscroft 1990). However, in Experiment Two, the pattern of results suggests that an ordinal
interaction may exist.
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Following Buckless and Ravenscroft’s (1990) recommendation, I estimate a planned
contrast using weights of -1, -1, +3 and -1, where Equal Work-Day Duration/Bonus has a weight
of +3 and all other conditions have a weight of -1. The planned contrast is significant (t = 2.04, p
< 0.05, one-tailed; Table 15, Panel B).18 This finding is in line with expectations. When output
quality is moderate, I expect that when Purpose is a bonus reward, a short Work-Day Duration
will signal that the employee is less hardworking, leading to lower evaluations of Subjective
Quality. However, when Purpose is a promotion reward, a short duration will not signal that the
employee is more efficient, thus not resulting in higher evaluations of Subjective Quality.
The simple effects analysis presented in Table 15, Panel C shows that when the Purpose
is a bonus, evaluations of Subjective Quality are significantly lower when Work-Day Duration is
short compared to when it is equal (t = 1.80, p = 0.04, one-tailed). In comparison, the simple
effects analysis shows that when the Purpose is a promotion, evaluations of Subjective Quality
are not significantly different when Work-Day Duration is short compared to when it is equal (t
= 0.08, p = 0.47, one-tailed). Taken together, I find that when the Purpose of the performance
reward is a bonus, the results of Experiment Two (H3) are consistent with Experiment One (H1);
short Work-Day Duration results in lower evaluations of Subjective Quality. However, when the
Purpose of the performance reward is a promotion, the results of Experiment Two (H4) differ
from those of Experiment One (H2); short Work-Day Duration does not result in higher
evaluations of Subjective Quality. The results of H3 and H4 are also presented in a graphic form
in Figure 4.

18

The semi-omnibus F-test on the residual between cells variance is insignificant (F = 0.01, p = 0.99) and the
residual between effect size (q2 = 0.07) indicates that only a limited amount of residual between cells effects remain
after accounting for the contrast (Guggenmos, Piercey and Agoglia 2017).
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5.5.4 Supplemental Tests of Hypotheses 3 & 4
In the development of H3 and H4, I examine whether short Work-Day Duration
professional employees will be perceived as less Hardworking when output quality is moderate,
and the performance reward is either a bonus or a promotion. Descriptive results of Hardworking
are shown in Table 16, Panel A. There is a significant difference in the mean Hardworking score
for short Work-Day Duration (m = 0.34; s.d. = 1.64) compared to equal Work-Day Duration (m
= 1.47; s.d. = 1.21) across purpose conditions (F = 26.12, p < 0.01, Table 16, Panel B). These
results are similar to the results when subjective output quality is good.
In the development of H4, I also examine whether short Work-Day Duration professional
employees will not be perceived as more Efficient when output quality is moderate, and the
performance reward is a promotion. Descriptive results of Efficient are shown in Table 17, Panel
A. The interaction of Work-Day Duration and Purpose is not significant (F = 0.61, p = 0.44,
Table 17, Panel B), which indicates that in promotion decisions, short duration professional
employees are not perceived as more efficient when the quality of subjective output is moderate.
To further examine the relationship between Work-Day Duration, Hardworking, Efficient
and Subjective Quality, I perform a multi-group path analysis similar to Figure 5. I first divide
participants into two groups by Purpose: bonus (n = 85) and promotion (n = 80). The error terms
associated with Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to covary and all path coefficients are
allowed to differ between groups.19 The model fit statistics indicate that the data fits this fully
unconstrained model well (Kline 2015). Specifically, the chi-square value of the model is
insignificant (χ²(2) = 2.29, p = 0.32), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is

19

When the Purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion), the correlation between the two error
terms is 0.67 (0.70).
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0.03, the Comprehensive Fit Index (CFI) is < 0.99, and the Normed Fit Index (NFI) is 0.99. I
continue my analysis to examine whether perceptions of Work-Day Duration influence
Hardworking and Efficient differently, and whether Hardworking and Efficient influence
Subjective Quality differently, depending on the purpose of the performance evaluation.
To understand whether the relationships between variables are different, depending on
the Purpose of the performance evaluation, I compare the fully unconstrained model against a
fully constrained model where all path coefficients are constrained to be the same between
groups. These two models do not yield a significantly different fit: (Δχ²(4) = 2.35, p = 0.67,
untabulated), suggesting that none of the path coefficients depend on whether the Purpose of the
performance evaluation is a bonus or a promotion. As the fully constrained model does not differ
significantly from the fully unconstrained model, I conclude that the fully constrained model is
the optimal model (χ²(6) = 4.65 (p = 0.59), RMSEA = 0.03, CFI > 0.99, NFI = 0.98). The path
coefficients derived from this fully constrained model are presented in Figure 5 and Table 18.
As shown in Figure 5 and Table 18, the coefficients between Work-Day Duration and
Hardworking (β = 0.37, SE = 0.22, p < 0.001), and Hardworking and Subjective Quality (β =
0.41, SE = 1.14, p < 0.001) in the bonus condition are similar to the coefficients between WorkDay Duration and Hardworking (β = 0.38, SE = 0.22, p < 0.001), and Hardworking and
Subjective Quality (β = 0.41, SE = 1.14, p < 0.001) in the promotion condition. The coefficients
between Work-Day Duration and Efficient (β = 0.03, SE = 0.22, p = 0.66), and Efficient and
Subjective Quality (β = 0.38, SE = 1.23, p < 0.001) in the bonus condition are similar to the
coefficients between Work-Day Duration and Efficient (β = 0.03, SE = 0.22, p = 0.66) and
Efficient and Subjective Quality (β = 0.39, SE = 1.23, p < 0.001) in the promotion condition.
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In summary, the results support the reasoning that in both bonus and promotion
decisions, when output quality is moderate, employees who work a short Work-Day Duration
will be perceived as less Hardworking and lead to lower evaluations of subjective output quality.
Furthermore, it supports the reasoning that in both bonus and promotion decisions, when output
quality is moderate, employees who work a short Work-Day Duration will not be perceived as
more efficient and thus will not lead to higher subjective evaluations of output quality.

5.6 Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and Participants’ Attention Checks
As discussed in Section 4.4.4 Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and
Participants’ Attention Checks, participants are asked two different questions to ensure they
understand the task and receive the experimental manipulations. The first question relates to the
work-day duration manipulation and asks participants to confirm the number of hours the
Analyst spends at work on a typical workday. I observe that 99% of participants respond
correctly on the first attempt during Experiment One, and 99% of participants respond correctly
on the first attempt during Experiment Two. The second question relates to the purpose of the
performance reward manipulation and asks participants to confirm what the purpose of the
performance reward is. I observe that 95% of participants respond correctly on the first attempt
during Experiment One, and 97% of participants respond correctly on the first attempt during
Experiment Two. On all questions, when participants do not answer correctly, they are prompted
to try the question again. They are not permitted to proceed until the questions are answered
correctly.
Participants are asked two different questions to ensure they carefully read the response
memo prepared by the Analyst. Both questions are similar in that they ask participants to recall
important details provided in the response memo. These two reading comprehension questions
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are asked to ensure that the participants carefully read the memo and do not just assign arbitrary
evaluation scores (Leiby et al. 2019). In Experiment One, 25 participants did not answer both
questions correctly and, in Experiment Two, 18 participants did not answer both questions
correctly.
Finally, I ask participants to respond to an additional attention check question. This
question asks participants to choose box c). In both Experiment One and Experiment Two, 99%
of participants answered this question correctly.

5.6.1 Excluded Participants
In total, I recruit 200 participants for each of my experiments. Two steps are taken to
exclude participants from the main analyses: First, with respect to participant engagement, 25
participants in my first experiment and 18 participants in my second experiment did not answer
the reading comprehension checks (regarding the response memo) correctly and are excluded
from the study. Second, participants who did not have the requisite supervisory experience are
also excluded from my main analyses. Specifically, based on the post experiment questionnaire
(PEQ) responses, 19 participants in my first experiment and 17 participants in my second
experiment did not have the requisite experience, and therefore are excluded from the main
analyses.
In total 44 participants were excluded from Experiment One, analysed in Sections 5.5.1
Test of Hypotheses 1 & 2 and 5.5.2 Supplemental Tests of Hypotheses 1 & 2, and 35 participants
were excluded from Experiment Two analysed in Sections 5.5.3 Test of Hypotheses 3 & 4 and
5.5.4 Supplemental Tests of Hypotheses 3 & 4.
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When including these participants in my analyses, the statistical inferences of my
hypotheses tests largely remain. The results are presented in Table 19 and Table 20. More
specifically, in Experiment One, the interaction remains significant (F= 5.52, p = 0.02, Table 19,
Panel B) and so do the follow-up simple effects of duration on bonus eligible participants (t =
1.57, p = 0.06, one-tailed, Table 19, Panel C) and the effect of duration on promotion eligible
participants (t = 1.75, p = 0.04, one-tailed, Table 19, Panel C). In Experiment Two, the
interaction remains non-significant (F = 1.32, p = 0.25, Table 20, Panel B), the follow-up simple
effects of duration on bonus eligible participants remains moderately significant (t = 1.37, p =
0.08, one-tailed, Table 20, Panel C), and the effects of duration on promotion eligible
participants remains insignificant (t = 0.26, p = 0.40, one-tailed, Table 20, Panel C).

5.7 Other Measured Variables
As discussed in Section 4.4.3 Other Measured Variables, I ask participants to respond to
several questions regarding individual differences with respect to their intuitive-experiential and
analytical-rational thinking styles to ensure that the effects of my manipulations are not driven by
individual differences. Questions asked are shown in Appendix 3. I perform an exploratory
factor analysis, a principal axis factor analysis in particular, shown in Table 21, Panel A. I
perform separate analyses for the need for cognition and the faith in intuition (Epstein et al.
1996) in both Experiment One and Experiment Two. In the analyses for the need for cognition, I
find a one factor solution with and eigenvalue of 3.08 and 61.67 % of the variance explained in
Experiment One and eigenvalue of 3.08 and 61.57% of the variance explained in Experiment
Two. The five items yield a Cronbach’s α of 0.83 in Experiment One and 0.82 in Experiment
Two, which indicates a relatively high reliability. In the analyses for faith in intuition, I find a
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one-factor solution with an eigenvalue of 3.82 and 76.42% of the variance explained in
Experiment One and an eigenvalue of 4.04 and 80.75% of the variance explained in Experiment
Two. The five items yield a Cronbach’s α of 0.92 in Experiment One and 0.94 in Experiment
Two, which indicates a relatively high reliability.
I subsequently create one new variable averaging all five items for the need for cognition
(Need for Cognition) and a second new variable averaging all five items for faith in intuition
(Faith in Intuition). Means and standard deviations for Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition
are shown in Table 22 (Experiment One) and Table 23 (Experiment Two). Using a MANOVA, I
examine whether these two individual difference variables differ between experimental
conditions.
In Experiment One, I find these two variables do not differ between conditions for WorkDay Duration (F = 0.30, p = 0.74, untabulated) or the interaction between Work-Day Duration
and Purpose (F = 2.15, p = 0.12, untabulated). However, they do differ between conditions for
Purpose (F = 3.08, p = 0.05, untabulated). A follow-up ANOVA shows that this difference is
caused by the Need for Cognition differing between the two purpose conditions (F = 5.63, p =
0.02, untabulated). To understand whether this difference influences the effect that Work-Day
Duration and Purpose have on evaluations of Subjective Quality, I perform an ANCOVA where
Subjective Quality is the dependent variable, Work-Day Duration and Purpose are the
independent variables and Need for Cognition is the covariate. I find that when Need for
Cognition is included as a covariate, the effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on
evaluations of Subjective Quality do not differ from what is presented in Section 5.5.1 Test of
Hypotheses 1 & 2. Specifically, the main effects of Work-Day Duration (F = 0.05, p = 0.82,
Table 22, Panel B) and Purpose (F = 0.20, p = 0.65, Table 22, Panel B) remain insignificant and
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the interaction effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose remains significant (F = 3.83, p = 0.05,
Table 22, Panel B).
In Experiment Two, MANOVA results suggest that these two variables do not differ
between conditions for Work-Day Duration (F = 0.76, p = 0.47, untabulated), Purpose (F = 0.47,
p = 0.63, untabulated) and the interaction between Work-Day Duration and Purpose (F = 0.18, p
= 0.84, untabulated).
5.8 Summary
This chapter provides the results observed in the evaluation of four hypotheses. In
Experiment One, using output of good quality, I demonstrate that perceptions of work-day
duration influence evaluations of output quality differently, depending on whether the evaluation
will help to determine a bonus or a promotion reward. Specifically, in bonus decisions, short
work-day duration results in lower evaluations of output quality whereas in promotions
decisions, short work-day duration results in higher evaluations of output quality. Results of the
path analysis suggests that this occurs because in bonus and promotion decisions, short work-day
duration signals that employees are less hardworking. However, in promotion decisions, short
work-day duration signals that employees are more efficient.
In Experiment Two, I broaden the scope of my analysis by examining a setting where
output quality is moderate. I find in bonus decisions, a short work-day duration will result in
lower evaluations of output quality compared to an equal work-day duration, consistent with
Experiment One. However, in promotion decisions, different from Experiment One, a short
work-day duration does not result in higher evaluations of output quality compared to an equal
work-day duration. The findings of Experiment Two suggest that output quality is an important
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boundary condition to how work-day duration affects Supervising Managers’ subjective
evaluations when the purpose of the reward is a promotion.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
6.1 Introduction
I begin this chapter by discussing the tests of hypotheses in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 I
discuss the limitations of my study and opportunities for future research. Finally, in Section 6.4, I
provide conclusions.

6.2 Discussion of Hypotheses Testing
In my dissertation, I investigate whether professional employees’ work-day duration
relative to the workplace norm will impact quality evaluations of subjective output, depending on
whether the evaluation will help to determine a bonus or a promotion reward. The results of my
study suggest that when professional employees produce subjective output, work-day duration is
a non-informative contextual cue that is considered by managers when making quality
evaluations. My results further suggest that the role of work-day duration depends on the purpose
of the performance evaluation.
In Experiment One, I examine a setting where the evaluated employee produces good
quality work (as confirmed by a validation test). I compare short work-day duration employees
(i.e., employees who work short hours relative to the workplace norm) to equal work-day
duration employees (i.e., employees who work hours equal to the workplace norm). I provide
evidence to suggest that managers not only use work-day duration in the evaluation of output
quality, but its use depends on the purpose of the performance evaluation. Specifically, when the
purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus, a short work-day duration negatively affects
the evaluation of output quality (Hypothesis 1), whereas when the purpose of the performance
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evaluation is a promotion, a short work-day duration positively affects the evaluation of output
quality (Hypothesis 2).
In a supplementary path analysis, I explore why work-day duration is interpreted
differently, depending on whether the purpose of the evaluation is to determine a bonus or a
promotion. When the purpose of the reward is to determine a bonus, I find that as work-day
duration increases, employees are perceived to be more hardworking and the perception of
hardworking positively influences evaluations of output quality. I also examine when the
purpose of the reward is to determine a promotion. Similar to when the performance reward is a
bonus, I find that as work-day duration increases, employees are perceived to be more
hardworking and such perceptions positively influence evaluations of output quality. However,
when the purpose of the reward is to determine a promotion reward, I find that as work-day
duration decreases, employees are perceived to be more efficient and the perception of efficiency
positively influences evaluations of output quality.
In Experiment Two, I examine a setting where the evaluated employee produces
moderate quality work (as confirmed by a validation test). Again, I compare short work-day
duration professional employees to equal work-day duration employees. I find that when the
purpose of the performance reward is bonus, the evaluation of output quality for short work-day
duration employees is lower compared to equal work-day duration employees (Hypothesis 3).
However, when the purpose of the performance reward is a promotion, the evaluation of output
quality for short work-day duration employees is not significantly different from equal duration
employees (Hypothesis 4).
Taken together, my results suggest that in bonus decisions, subjective evaluations of output
quality for short work-day duration employees will be lower compared to equal work-day
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duration employees whether the output quality produced is good or moderate. However, in
promotion decisions, short work-day duration employees will receive higher subjective
evaluations of output quality only when the output quality produced is good.

6.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
My study has limitations that provide opportunities for future research to explore. First,
my results may be sensitive to the method used to manipulate work-day duration. In my study, I
examine work-day duration that is observed in an office setting. However, work-day duration
can be observed in a virtual office setting. Work-day duration in a virtual office setting may be
observed if employees who work remotely are logged in to a virtual platform where their status
shows as available or unavailable. Employees who are always set to available may not be
perceived as hardworking compared to employees who are physically present in an office setting.
For example, because Supervising Managers are physically unable to see employees, they may
question whether the employees are actually at their desks working or out engaging in personal
tasks. Future research could explore whether my observations generalize to virtual office
environments. Second, the results may be sensitive to the subjective output I have created. In this
study, I examine subjective output that is in written form. There are many other different types of
subjective output that could be evaluated in a professional workplace setting, which may be more
ambiguous and, therefore, more difficult to evaluate (e.g., customer relations or mentorship of
junior employees). Some research suggests as the object of evaluation becomes more ambiguous,
the more likely it is that outside factors can influence evaluations (e.g., Hsee 1996a). Finally, in
my study I examine how Supervising Managers evaluate output of a single employee. In
practice, some Supervising Managers may be responsible for evaluating output of more than one
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employee (e.g., a tournament where evaluations depend on relative performance evaluations).
Some research suggests that an evaluator will make different evaluations when there are multiple
items to evaluate, compared to a single item (e.g., Hsee 1996b). Future research could explore
whether my observations generalize to settings where Supervising Managers evaluate multiple
employees.

6.4 Conclusions
My dissertation makes contributions to accounting research and practice. Existing
research suggests that one way to improve compensation contracting is to use subjective
performance measures to evaluate output that is not objectively determined (Holmstrom 1979).
However, if subjective evaluations result in inaccurate assessments of performance, it could
undermine the intended benefits of subjectivity (Prendergast and Topel 1993). First, my study
extends our understanding of how cognitive limitations in subjective evaluations lead to
inaccurate assessments (e.g., Bol and Smith 2011; Bol and Leiby 2018). Different from prior
research, my study identifies that a non-informative contextual cue (i.e., work-day duration) that
provides no information about subjective quality does in fact influence subjective evaluations.
Second, my research extends our understanding of the role of duration in performance
measurement and incentives. Existing research that examines the role of duration often does so
in settings where (effort) duration is an important determinant of output. Effort duration is
usually contractible and is increased through the use of various type of incentives (e.g., Tafkov
2013; Awasthi and Pratt 1990; Hecht et al. 2018). My study differs from such conceptualization
of duration as I examine the role of work-day duration, which does not have a direct relationship
with work output.
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This research provides contributions to practice. My study provides insights to
Supervising Managers who evaluate output that is measured using an element of subjectivity.
Family dynamics in North America continue to change (United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Statistics 2018; Uppal 2015) and working parents are often required to juggle work
demands with family responsibilities (Wademan Dowling 2019), which could limit the number
of hours they spend at work. My study provides some evidence to suggest that the hours an
employee works could influence how their work is evaluated, even though it provides no
information regarding quality. My research brings to the forefront this important and prevalent
bias in the workplace.
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FIGURES
Figure 1 Experiments One and Two: Experimental Procedures

Notes:
a
The good quality memo was shown in Experiment One and the moderate quality memo was shown in Experiment
Two.
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Figure 2 Results of Experiment One: Effects of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective
Quality a
89

Subjective Quality

88
87
86
85
84
83
82
81
80

Short

Equal
Bonus

Promotion

Notes:
a
Refer to Table 9 for variable definitions.
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Figure 3 Experiment One: Path Analysis a
Model with Standardized Path Coefficients
Bonus b
0.35***
0.sdfd

Hardworkingd

0.38***

Subjective
Qualityf

Work-Day
Duration c
0.11
0s

Efficiente

0.24*

0.33***

Hardworkingd

0.29***

Promotionb

Work-Day
Durationc

Subjective
Qualityf
-0.20*
sd

Efficiente

0.37***

Notes:
a
The model presented is a partially constrained model where Duration à Hardworking and Hardworking
à Subjective Quality are constrained to be equal between two groups: Bonus (N = 72) and Promotion (N =
84). The model is specified so that the error terms between Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to
covary. When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion), the correlation between
the two error terms is 0.77 (0.57). Short duration is coded as 0 and equal duration is coded as 1. The data
fits the model well: χ²(4) = 7.50 (p = 0.11), RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96. *** p < 0.01, * p <
0.10. All p-values are two-tailed.
b
Two types of purpose of performance evaluation are studied: bonus and promotion. Participants are told
either that their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it
will help determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Two levels of Duration are examined: Equal and Short. Participants are told that employees work either
equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in
contrast to other employees.
d
Hardworking refers to participants’ reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hardworking
employee” on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to
“Strongly Agree.”
e
Efficient refers to participants’ reaction to the statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
f
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to
the subjective output.
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Figure 4 Results of Experiment Two: Effects of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective
Quality a
74

Subjective Quality

72
70
68
66
64
62
60
58
56

Short

Equal
Bonus

Promotion

Notes:
a
Refer to Table 14 for variable definitions.
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Figure 5 Experiment Two: Path Analysis a
Model with Standardized Path Coefficients
Bonusb

Work-Day
Duration c

0.37 ***
0.

Hardworkingd

0.41***

Subjective
Qualityf

0.03

Efficiente

0.38***

0.38***

Hardworkingd

0.41***

Promotionb

Work-Day
Durationc

Subjective
Qualityf
0.03
sdddds

Efficiente

0.39***

Notes:
a
Model Fit statistics for the fully constrained model include: N = 165; χ²(6) = 4.65 (p = 0.59), RMSEA =
0.03, CFI = > 0.99, NFI = 0.98
The model is specified so that the error terms between Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to covary.
When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion) the correlation between the two
error terms is 0.67 (0.70). Short duration is coded as 0 and equal duration is coded as 1.
*** p < 0.01. All p-values are two-tailed.
b
Two types of purpose of performance evaluation are studied: bonus (n = 85) and promotion (n = 80).
Participants are told either that their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee
receives a bonus or that it will help determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Two levels of Duration are examined: Equal and Short. Participants are told that employees work either
equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in
contrast to other employees.
d
Hardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hardworking
employee” on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to
“Strongly Agree.”
e
Efficient refers to participants’ reaction to the statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
f
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to
the subjective output.
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TABLES
Table 1 Experiments One and Experiment Two: Prolific Filters and My Follow-Up Questions
Prolific
filter
Current
country of
residence
Leadership/
Position of
power/
Supervisor
duties

Highest
education
level

Question asked to
participants in
Prolific
In what country do
you currently reside?

Filters selected
United States
Canada

At work, do you
have supervisory
responsibilities? In
other words, do you
have the authority to
give instructions to
subordinates?

Yes

Using numbers only,
approximately how many
employees have you
supervised in the past? If
you have not supervised
anyone at work in the past,
please type 0.

What is the highest
level of education
you have completed?

Undergraduate
(BA/BSc/other)

What is the highest degree
level of school you have
completed?
• Secondary School
Diploma (or
equivalent)
• Some
college/university,
no degree
• Trade/technical/
vocational training
• Associate degree
• Bachelor’s degree
• Master’s degree
• Professional degree
• Doctorate degree
• Other

Graduate degree
(MA/MSc/MPhil/other)
Doctorate degree
(PhD/MD/other)

Previous
Studies

Follow-up question to
confirm the effectiveness
of the filter

Participants who took part
in the selected studies
(i.e., any previous studies
using the same
experimental task) will not
be able to participate in
this one.
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Table 2 Experiments One and Two: Validation of the Dependent Variable Subjective Quality a
Panel A: Mean (Standard Deviation) of Memo Quality Criteria
Experiment Experiment
One
Two
(n = 156)
(n = 165)
1. The overall quality of ideas (Ideas) b

85.65
(13.28)

68.48
(24.28)

2. The organization, development and expression of ideas
(Organization) b

82.20
(16.10)

65.34
(24.66)

3. The use of relevant supporting reasons and examples
(Examples) b

82.56
(16.35)

68.78
(24.31)

4. Control over the elements of standard written English
(English) b

87.94
(12.22)

65.33
(28.52)

Panel B: Correlations with the Dependent Variable Subjective Quality a
Question

1.
2.
3.
4.

Experiment Experiment
One (n =
Two (n =
156)
165)
Subjective
Quality a
0.70**
0.77**
0.66**
0.55**

Ideas
Organization
Examples
English

Subjective
Quality a
0.82**
0.80**
0.79**
0.73**

Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst's response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Responses are collected on a Poor–Excellent 100-point scale.
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01.
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Table 3 Experiments One and Two: Participant Background
Experiment One (n = 156)
Mean
Medi Range
(s.d)
an

Experiment Two (n = 165)
Mean
Media Range
(s.d)
n

Supervised a

24.70
(56.98)

10

1–500

44.13
(312.06)

9

1–4000

Age

36.31
(11.21)

33

22–76

37.27
(10.01)

35

22–66

Work
Experience b

14.23
(10.46)

12

2–50

15.49
(10.11)

14

0–50

Work Hours c

13.54
(12.86)

8

2–60

11.56
(9.55)

8

2–50

Education

d

Secondary school diploma

Experiment One
Number
Percentage

Experiment Two
Number
Percentage

0%

0%

0%

0%

Some college/university

3

2%

3

2%

Trade/technical/vocational
training

1

1%

1

1%

Associate degree

3

2%

2

1%

Bachelor’s degree

95

61%

98

59%

Master’s degree

39

25%

42

25%

Professional degree

7

4%

14

9%

Doctorate degree

8

5%

5

3%

Other

0

0%

0%

0%

Total

156

100%

165

100%
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Table 3 (Continued) Experiments One and Two: Participant Background
Gender

Experiment One
Number
Percentage

Experiment Two
Number
Percentage

Female

52

33%

84

51%

Male

104

67%

78

47%

Other

0

0%

3

2%

Total

156

100%

165

100%

GMAT e

Experiment One
Number
Percentage

Experiment Two
Number
Percentage

Yes

11

7%

13

8%

No

145

93%

152

92%

Total

156

100%

165

100%

Notes:
a
Supervised refers to the total number of employees supervised by the participant.
b
Work Experience refers to the years of full-time work experience reported by the participant.
c
Work Hours refers to the average amount of time the participant spends at work each day.
d
Education refers to the highest level of education completed by the participant.
e
GMAT refers to whether the participant has previously taken the GMAT.
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Table 4 Experiments One and Two: Participant Characteristics as Covariate Analysis
Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a
Panel A: Experiment One Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA)
Source of Variation

Supervised b
Duration c
Purpose d
Duration x Purpose
Error

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)f

1
1
1
1

1416.82
12.41
106.49
279.69

15.19
0.13
1.14
3.00

0.00
0.72
0.29
0.09

151

93.26

Panel B: Experiment Two Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA)
Source of Variation

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

Age
Work Experience e
Duration c
Purpose d
Duration x Purpose

1
1
1
1
1

3.86
311.92
990.02
296.42
1098.62

0.01
0.53
1.68
0.50
1.86

0.94
0.47
0.20
0.48
0.17

159

589.59

Error

Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Supervised refers to the total number of employees supervised by the participant.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
d
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
e
Work Experience refers to the years of full-time work experience reported by the participant.
f
In this table, and all the tables that follow, one-tailed p-values are used for directional predictions and two-tailed pvalues are used for non-directional predictions.
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Table 5 Experiment One: Validation Test on Output Quality
Means (Standard Deviations) of Subjective Quality a

Response Memo
Score

Response
Memo 1
81.09
(13.07)
n = 23b

Response
Memo 2
91.11
(8.08)
n = 27 b

Response
Memo 3
81.26
(10.97)
n = 23 b

Response
Memo 4
78.65
(14.52)
n = 26 b

Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Observations from 99 participants are analysed. Each participant evaluates two response memos. I examine only the
score of the first response memo evaluated by each participant.
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Table 6 Experiment Two: Validation Test on Output Quality
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Subjective Quality a
Good Quality

Moderate Quality

82.02
(13.46)
n = 51

72.00
(18.73)
n = 48

Response Memo Score

Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

Response Memo b

1

2482.43

9.43

< 0.01

Error

97

263.33

Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Response Memo refers to the subjective output participants evaluate. It is either good or moderate quality.
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Table 7 Experiment One: Perceptions of Response Memo (Good Quality) (n = 156)
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Perception Measures

I enjoyed reading “the Analyst’s”
response
(Enjoy Reading) a

I enjoyed reading about the topic in the
memo
(Enjoy Topic) a

I thought that “the Analyst” had a good
writing style
(Writing Style) a

I have a strong opinion about the
problem/issue presented by the client
(Strong Opinion) a

Bonus b

Promotionb

Overall
Average

Short
Duration c

1.65
(1.13)

1.95
(0.83)

1.82
(0.98)

Equal
Duration c

1.71
(0.98)

1.79
(1.18)

1.75
(1.09)

Overall
Average

1.68
(1.05)

1.87
(1.02)

1.78
(1.03)

Short
Duration c

1.44
(1.08)

1.95
(0.73)

1.72
(0.93)

Equal
Duration c

1.74
(1.03)

1.36
(1.25)

1.54
(1.16)

Overall
Average

1.60
(1.06)

1.65
(1.06)

1.63
(1.06)

Short
Duration c

1.44
(1.08)

1.67
(1.12)

1.57
(1.10)

Equal
Duration c

1.61
(1.29)

1.45
(1.23)

1.53
(1.25)

Overall
Average

1.53
(1.19)

1.56
(1.18)

1.54
(1.18)

Short
Duration c

0.56
(1.73)

0.48
(1.52)

0.51
(1.60)

Equal
Duration c

0.05
(1.59)

0.38
(1.75)

0.23
(1.68)

Overall
Average

0.29
(1.67)

0.43
(1.63)

0.37
(1.64)
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Table 7 (Continued) Experiment One: Perceptions of Response Memo (Good Quality) (n = 156)
Panel B: Correlations Among Perception Measures

Enjoy Reading
Enjoy Topic
Writing Style
Strong Opinion

Enjoy
Reading
1.00
0.70**
0.72**
0.32**

Enjoy Topic

Writing Style

Strong Opinion

1.00
0.56**
0.28**

1.00
0.23**

1.00

Panel C: One Sample T-Tests Comparing if Perception Differs from Neutral Point of
Zero
df

t

Enjoy Reading

155

21.6

p-value
(two-tailed)
< 0.01

Enjoy Topic

155

19.28

< 0.01

Writing Style

155

16.40

< 0.01

Strong Opinion

155

2.78

0.01

Notes:
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01.
a
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly
Agree.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
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Table 8 Experiment Two: Perceptions of Response Memo (Moderate Quality) (n = 165)
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Perception Measures

I enjoyed reading “the Analyst’s”
response
(Enjoy Reading) a

I enjoyed reading about the topic in the
memo
(Enjoy Topic) a

I thought that “the Analyst” had a good
writing style
(Writing Style) a

I have a strong opinion about the
problem/issue presented by the client
(Strong Opinion) a

Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall
Average

Short
Duration c

-0.05
(1.90)

0.17
(1.70)

0.05
(1.80)

Equal
Duration c

0.89
(1.48)

-0.02
(1.66)

0.43
(1.66)

Overall
Average

0.44
(1.75)

0.06
(1.67)

0.25
(1.72)

Short
Duration c

-0.12
(2.15)

-0.14
(1.97)

-0.13
(2.05)

Equal
Duration c

0.27
(2.03)

-0.16
(1.90)

0.06
(1.97)

Overall
Average

0.08
(2.08)

-0.15
(1.92)

-0.03
(2.00)

Short
Duration c

0.73
(1.42)

0.78
(1.61)

0.75
(1.50)

Equal
Duration c

1.14
(1.29)

0.36
(1.45)

0.75
(1.42)

Overall
Average

0.94
(1.36)

0.55
(1.53)

0.75
(1.45)

Short
Duration c

-0.34
(1.41)

-0.64
(1.57)

-0.48
(1.48)

Equal
Duration c

0.11
(1.65)

-0.55
(1.49)

-0.22
(1.59)

Overall
Average

-0.11
(1.54)

-0.59
(1.52)

-0.34
(1.54)
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Table 8 (Continued) Experiment Two: Perceptions of Response Memo (Moderate Quality) (n =
165)
Panel B: Correlations Among Perception Measures

Enjoy Reading
Enjoy Topic
Writing Style
Strong Opinion

Enjoy Reading

Enjoy Topic

Writing Style

Strong Opinion

1.00
0.78**
0.62**
0.28**

1.00
0.40**
0.28**

1.00
0.36**

1.00

Panel C: One Sample T-Tests Comparing if Perception Differs from Neutral Point of
Zero
df

t

Enjoy Reading

164

1.91

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.06

Enjoy Topic

164

-0.19

0.85

Writing Style

164

6.66

< 0.01

Strong Opinion

164

-2.82

0.01

Notes:
** Correlation is significant at p < 0.01.
a
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly
Agree.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am-3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
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Table 9 Experiment One: Descriptive Statistics
Means (Standard Deviations) of Subjective Quality a
Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall
Average

Short Duration c

84.82
(8.10)
n = 34

87.12
(8.98)
n = 42

86.09
(8.62)
n = 76

Equal Duration c

87.89
(9.33)
n = 38

82.93
(12.89)
n = 42

85.29
(11.54)
n = 80

Overall Average

86.44
(8.85)
n = 72

85.02
(11.24)
n = 84

85.68
(10.98)
n = 156

Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am-3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
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Table 10 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a
Panel A: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation
Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

1
1
1

12.12
69.01
510.25

0.12
0.68
5.00

0.73
0.41
0.03

Error
152
101.97
Panel B: Simple Effects by Purpose (Tests of H1 and H2)

Effect of Duration on
bonus eligible
participants (H1)
Effect of Duration on
promotion eligible
participants (H2)

Difference

df

MS

t-statistic

p-value
(one-tailed)d

-3.07

1

169.26

1.29

0.10

4.19

1

368.76

1.90

0.03

Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
d
Predictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 11 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Hardworking a
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Hardworking
Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall
Average

Short Duration c

1.29
(1.23)
n = 34

1.38
(1.23)
n = 42

1.34
(1.22)
n = 76

c

2.18
(0.73)
n = 38

1.95
(0.85)
n = 42

2.06
(0.80)
n = 80

Overall Average

1.76
(1.08)
n = 72

1.67
(1.09)
n = 84

1.71
(1.08)
n = 156

Equal Duration

Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose

1
1
1

20.67
0.20
0.98

19.57
0.19
0.93

< 0.01
0.66
0.34

152

1.06

Error

Notes:
a
Hardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hardworking employee”
on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
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Table 12 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Efficient a
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Efficient
Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall
Average

1.79
(0.88)
n = 34

2.19
(0.74)
n = 42

2.01
(0.83)
n = 76

Equal Duration c

2.11
(0.89)
n = 38

1.76
(0.71)
n = 42

1.92
(0.99)
n = 80

Overall Average

1.96
(0.90)
n = 72

1.98
(0.92)
n = 84

1.97
(0.91)
n = 156

Short Duration c

Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose

1
1
1

0.13
0.03
5.30

0.17
0.03
6.64

0.68
0.85
0.01

Error
152
0.80
Panel C: Simple Effects by Purpose (Supporting H1 and H2)

Effect of Duration on
bonus eligible
participants
Effect of Duration on
promotion eligible
participants

Difference

df

MS

t-statistic

p-value
(one-tailed)d

-0.31

1

1.74

1.48

0.07

0.43

1

3.86

2.20

0.02
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Notes:
a
Efficient refers to participants’ reaction to the following statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
d
Predictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 13 Experiment One: Path Coefficients Estimates from Multi-Group Path Analysisa
Bonusb

Promotionb

p
p
Standardized Standard (two- Standardized Standard (twoEstimate
Error
tailed) Estimate
Error tailed)
Work-Day
à Hardworkingd
Durationc

0.35

0.16

< 0.001

0.33

0.17

< 0.001

Work-Day
à
Durationc

Efficiente

0.11

0.17

0.25

-0.20

0.18

0.05

Hardworkingd à

Subjective
Qualityf

0.38

0.79

< 0.001

0.29

0.79

< 0.001

à

Subjective
Qualityf

0.24

1.17

0.05

0.37

1.23

< 0.001

Efficiente

Notes:
a
The model presented is a partially constrained model where Duration à Hardworking and Hardworking
à Subjective Quality are constrained to be equal between two groups: Bonus (N = 72) and Promotion (N =
84). The model is specified so that the error terms between Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to
covary. When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion) the correlation between the
two error terms is 0.77 (0.57). Short duration is coded as 0 and equal duration is coded as 1. The data fits
the model well: χ²(4) = 7.50 (p = 0.11), RMSEA = 0.08, CFI = 0.98, NFI = 0.96.
b
Two types of purpose of performance evaluation are studied: bonus and promotion. Participants are told
either that their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it
will help determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Two levels of Duration are examined: Equal and Short. Participants are told that employees work either
equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in
contrast to other employees.
d
Hardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hard-working
employee” on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to
“Strongly Agree.”
e
Efficient refers to participants’ reaction to the statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
f
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to
the subjective output.
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Table 14 Experiment Two: Descriptive Statistics
Means (Standard Deviations) of Subjective Quality a
Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall
Average

c

62.61
(31.57)
n = 41

63.50
(24.11)
n = 36

63.03
(28.15)
n = 77

c

72.07
(17.91)
n = 44

63.91
(22.35)
n = 44

69.77
(20.55)
n = 88

Overall Average

67.51
(25.72)
n = 85

63.73
(23.01)
n = 80

65.67
(24.44)
n = 165

Short Duration

Equal Duration

Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s
response/memo. Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am-3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
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Table 15 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a
Panel A: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation
Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose
Error

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

1
1
1

997.39
541.23
838.85

1.68
0.91
1.42

0.20
0.34
0.24

161

592.94

Panel B: Results of Planned Contrast
Contrasts Weights (-1, -1, +3, -1)d

Duration c and Purpose b

df

t-statistic

p-value
(one-tailed)e

161

2.04

< 0.05

Panel C: Simple Effects by Purpose (Supporting H3 and H4)

Effect of Duration on
bonus eligible
participants (H3)
Effect of Duration on
promotion eligible
participants (H4)

Difference

df

MS

t-statistic

p-value
(one-tailed)e

-9.46

1

1898.70

1.80

0.04

-0.41

1

3.31

0.08

0.47

Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
d
“-1” is assigned to short duration/promotion reward, short duration/bonus reward and equal duration/promotion
reward conditions. “+3” is assigned to the equal duration/bonus reward condition.
e
Predictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed.
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Table 16 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Hardworking a
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Hardworking

Short Duration c

Equal Duration c

Overall Average

Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall
Average

0.46
(1.70)
n = 41

0.19
(1.56)
n = 36

0.34
(1.64)
n = 77

1.66
(1.16)
n = 44

1.27
(1.25)
n = 44

1.47
(1.21)
n = 88

1.08
(0.79)
n = 85

0.79
(1.49)
n = 80

0.94
(1.53)
n = 165

Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose

1
1
1

52.97
4.40
0.14

26.12
2.17
0.07

< 0.01
0.14
0.79

161

2.03

Error

Notes:
a
Hardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hardworking employee”
on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
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Table 17 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Efficient a
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) of Efficient
Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall
Average

Short Duration c

1.15
(1.53)
n = 41

1.08
(1.52)
n = 36

1.12
(1.51)
n = 77

Equal Duration c

1.41
(1.30)
n = 44

1.00
(1.33)
n = 44

1.20
(1.32)
n = 88

1.28
(1.41)
n = 85

1.04
(1.41)
n = 80

1.16
(1.41)
n = 165

Overall Average

Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose

1
1
1

0.33
2.28
1.23

0.17
1.14
0.61

0.69
0.29
0.44

161

2.00

Error

Notes:
a
Efficient refers to participants’ reaction to the following statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
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Table 18 Experiment Two: Path Coefficients Estimates from Multi-Group Path Analysisa

Bonusb

Promotionb

p
p
Standardized Standard (two- Standardized Standard (twoEstimate
Error
tailed) Estimate
Error tailed)
Work-Day à Hardworkingd
Durationc

0.37

0.22

< 0.001

0.38

0.22

< 0.001

Work-Day à
Durationc

Efficiente

0.03

0.22

0.66

0.03

0.22

0.66

Hardworkingd à

Subjective
Qualityf

0.41

1.14

< 0.001

0.41

1.14

< 0.001

à

Subjective
Qualityf

0.38

1.23

< 0.001

0.39

1.23

< 0.001

Efficiente

Notes:
a
Model Fit statistics for the fully constrained model include: N = 165; χ²(6) = 4.65 (p = 0.59), RMSEA =
0.03, CFI = > 0.99, NFI = 0.98.
The model is specified so that the error terms between Hardworking and Efficient are allowed to covary.
When the purpose of the performance evaluation is a bonus (promotion), the correlation between the two
error terms is 0.67 (0.70). Short duration is coded as 0 and equal duration is coded as 1.
b
Two types of purpose of performance evaluation are studied: bonus (n = 85) and promotion (n = 80).
Participants are told either that their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee
receives a bonus or that it will help determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Two levels of Duration are examined: Equal and Short. Participants are told that employees work either
equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in
contrast to other employees.
d
Hardworking refers to participants reaction to the following statement “The employee is a hard-working
employee” on a 7-point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to
“Strongly Agree.”
e
Efficient refers to participants’ reaction to the statement “The employee is an efficient employee” on a 7point Likert scale where -3 corresponds to “Strongly Disagree” and +3 corresponds to “Strongly Agree.”
f
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to
the subjective output.
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Table 19 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a
including all Participants (n = 200) e
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations)
Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall Average

c

82.69
(13.49)
n = 48

86.26
(9.80)
n = 50

84.51
(11.83)
n = 98

Equal Duration c

86.40
(10.97)
n = 52

82.12
(12.78)
n = 50

84.30
(12.03)
n = 102

Overall Average

84.62
(12.32)
n = 100

84.19
(11.52)
n = 100

84.41
11.90
n = 200

Short Duration

Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation
Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

1
1
1

2.24
6.32
770.91

0.02
0.05
5.52

0.90
0.83
0.02

Error
196
139.77
Panel C: Simple Effects by Purpose (Tests of H1 and H2)

Effect of Duration on
bonus eligible
participants (H1)
Effect of Duration on
promotion eligible
participants (H2)

Difference

df

MS

t-statistic

p-value
(one-tailed)d

3.72

1

344.73

1.57

0.06

-4.14

1

428.49

1.75

0.04
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Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst’s response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
d
Predictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed.
e
200 participants were originally recruited; 44 participants are excluded from the main analyses for either not having
the requisite experience (19 participants) or for not being engaged throughout the study (25 participants).

105

Table 20 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on Subjective Quality a
including all Participants (n = 200)e
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations)
Bonus b

Promotion b

Overall Average

c

65.39
(30.40)
n = 51

66.16
(23.81)
n = 51

65.77
(27.17)
n = 102

Equal Duration c

72.04
(20.11)
n = 51

64.85
(22.11)
n = 47

68.59
(21.29)
n = 98

Overall Average

68.72
(25.86)
n = 102

65.53
(22.90)
n = 98

67.15
(24.45)
n = 200

Short Duration

Panel B: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source of Variation
Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose
Error

df

MS

F-statistic

p-value
(two-tailed)

1
1
1

356.17
515.11
789.61

0.60
0.86
1.32

0.44
0.36
0.25

196

598.20

Panel C: Simple Effects by Purpose (Tests of H3 and H4)

Effect of Duration on
bonus eligible
participants (H3)
Effect of Duration on
promotion eligible
participants (H4)

Difference

df

MS

t-statistic

p-value
(one-tailed)d

-6.65

1

1126.68

1.37

0.08

1.31

1

41.41

0.26

0.40
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Notes:
a
Subjective Quality refers to the score (Poor–Excellent on a 100-point scale) that the participants assigned to the
subjective output. Specifically, participants were instructed: “Rate the quality of the Analyst's response/memo.
Indicate your evaluation of quality by sliding the bar to the appropriate score.”
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
d
Predictions are directional; therefore, all p-values are one-tailed
e
200 participants were originally recruited; 35 participants are excluded from the main analyses for either not having
the requisite experience (17 participants) or for not being engaged throughout the study (18 participants).

107

Table 21 Experiments One and Two: Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) Rational-Experimental
Inventory (REI) Items a
Panel A: Need for Cognition
Item
1. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking b

Factor Loadings
Experiment Experiment
One
Two
(n = 156)
(n = 165)
0.83
0.84

2. I try to avoid situations that require in-depth thinking
about something b

0.87

0.84

3. I prefer to do something that challenges my abilities
rather than something that requires little thought b

0.73

0.79

4. I prefer complex to simple problems b

0.64

0.68

0.53

0.43

3.08
61.67%

3.08
61.57%

5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something
gives me little satisfaction b
Eigenvalue
% of Variance explained
Panel B: Faith in Intuition
Item
1. I trust my initial feelings about people b

Factor Loadings
Experiment Experiment
One
Two
(n = 156)
(n = 165)
0.81
0.89

2. I believe in trust and hunches b

0.83

0.85

3. My initial impressions of people are almost always
right b

0.82

0.82

4. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on
my “gut feelings” b

0.87

0.90

5. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even
if I can’t explain how I know b
Eigenvalue
% of Variance explained

0.87

0.85

3.82
76.42%

4.04
80.75%
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Notes:
a
The EFA was performed using a principal axis factor analysis.
b
Responses are collected using a 7-point Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly
Agree.”
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Table 22 Experiment One: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on the Need for Cognition
and Faith in Intuition a
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviations) for Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition

Short
Duration c
Equal
Duration c
Overall
Average

Need for Cognition a
Bonus b Promotion b
Overall
Average
1.58
1.48
1.53
(1.22)
(0.87)
(1.03)
n = 34
n = 42
n = 76
1.76
1.04
1.38
(0.93)
(1.25)
(1.16)
n = 38
n = 42
n = 80
1.68
1.26
1.45
(1.07)
(1.09)
(1.10)
n = 72
n = 84
n = 156

Bonus b
0.91
(1.03)
n = 34
0.69
(1.22)
n = 38
0.79
(1.13)
n = 72

Faith in Intuition a
Promotion b
Overall
Average
0.85
0.87
(1.28)
(1.17)
n = 42
n = 76
1.09
0.90
(1.19)
(1.21)
n = 42
n = 80
0.97
0.88
(1.23)
(1.19)
n = 84
n = 156

Panel B: Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA)
Effect of Work-Day Duration, Purpose and Need for Cognition on Subjective Quality
Source of Variation

df

MS

F-statistic

Need for Cognition a
Duration c
Purpose b
Duration x Purpose

1
1
1
1

374.66
5.13
20.24
383.29

3.74
0.05
0.20
3.83

151

100.17

Error

p-value
(two-tailed)
0.06
0.82
0.65
0.05

Notes:
a
Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition refer to the participants’ thinking style and is an average of 5 questions
answered on a Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly Agree.” They were measured
as post-experiment questions. Questions are shown in Appendix 3.
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.

110

Table 23 Experiment Two: Effect of Work-Day Duration and Purpose on the Need for
Cognition and Faith in Intuition a
Means (Standard Deviations) for Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition

Short
Duration c
Equal
Duration c
Overall
Average

Need for Cognition a
Bonus b Promotion b
Overall
Average
1.34
1.27
1.31
(0.89)
(1.18)
(1.03)
n = 41
n = 36
n = 77
1.46
1.49
1.48
(1.08)
(1.13)
(1.10)
n = 44
n = 44
n = 88
1.40
1.39
1.40
(0.99)
(1.14)
(1.07)
n = 85
n = 80
n = 165

Bonus b
0.69
(1.29)
n = 41
0.73
(1.33)
n = 44
0.71
(1.30)
n = 85

Faith in Intuition a
Promotion b
Overall
Average
0.77
0.73
(1.30)
(1.29)
n = 36
n = 77
1.03
0.88
(1.17)
(1.25)
n = 44
n = 88
0.92
0.81
(1.23)
(1.27)
n = 80
n = 165

Notes:
a
Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition refer to the participants thinking style and is an average of 5 questions
answered on a Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly Agree.” They were measured
as post-experiment questions. Questions are shown in Appendix 3.
b
Bonus/Promotion refers to the Purpose manipulation of the performance evaluation. Participants are told either that
their evaluation of quality will help to determine whether the employee receives a bonus or that it will help
determine whether they receive a promotion.
c
Equal/Short Duration refers to the Work-Day Duration manipulation. Participants are told that employees work
either equal hours (9am–5pm compared to 9am–5pm) or short hours (9am–3pm compared to 9am–5pm) in contrast
to the other employees.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 Experimental Instrument
Screen 1: Welcome Screen [All conditions]

112

Screen 2: Role Description [All conditions]

113

Screen 3: Background Information [All conditions]

114

Screen 4 [Work-Day Duration and Purpose of Performance Reward Manipulations]
Screen 4: Work-Day Duration Equal and Bonus Reward Condition

115

Screen 4: Work-Day Duration Equal and Promotion Reward Condition

116

Screen 4: Work-day Duration Short and Bonus Reward Condition

117

Screen 4: Work-day Duration Short and Promotion Reward Condition

118

Screen 5: Evaluation Criteria [All conditions]

119

Screen 6: Task Understanding and Attention Check Preamble [All conditions]

120

Screen 7: Task Understanding Check One [All conditions]

121

Screen 8: Instructional Attention Check One [All conditions]

122

Screen 9: Task Understanding Check Two [All conditions]

123

Screen 10: Introduction to the Experimental Task [All conditions]

124

Screen 10: Experimental Task [All conditions, Experiment One]
*the small box in the top right-hand corner is different, depending on the experimental condition

125

Screen 10: Experimental Task [All conditions, Experiment One] – Continued

126

Screen 10: Experimental Task [All conditions, Experiment Two]
*the small box in the top right-hand corner is different, depending on the experimental condition

127

Screen 10: Experimental Task [All conditions, Experiment Two] – Continued

128

Screen 12: Follow-Up Questions About Subjective Evaluation [All conditions]

129

Screen 13: Reading Comprehension Checks [All conditions, Experiment One]

130

Screen 13: Reading Comprehension Checks [All conditions, Experiment Two]

131

Screen 14: Perceptions of the Response Memo [All conditions]

132

Screen 15: Open-Ended Question for the Subjective Evaluation (Dependent Variable) [All
conditions]

133

Screen 16: Demographics and Other Variables Preamble [All conditions]

134

Screen 17: Perceptions of the Analyst [All conditions]

135

Screen 18: Perceptions of Work-Day Duration [All conditions]

136

Screen 19: Rational-Experimental Inventory Scale [All conditions]

137

Screen 20: Rational-Experimental Inventory Scale [All conditions]

138

Screen 21: Demographics [All conditions]

139

Screen 21: Demographics [All conditions] – Continued

140

Screen 22: Demographics [All conditions]

141

Screen 23: Usable Response Declaration [All conditions]

142

Appendix 2 Experiments One and Two: Independent Variable Manipulations
Condition 1: Short work-day duration, bonus reward

143

Appendix 2 (Continued) Experiments One and Two: Independent Variable Manipulations
Condition 2: Short work-day duration, promotion reward

144

Appendix 2 (Continued) Experiments One and Two: Independent Variable Manipulations
Condition 3: Equal work-day duration, bonus reward

145

Appendix 2 (Continued) Experiments One Two: Independent Variable Manipulations
Condition 4: Equal work-day duration, promotion reward

146

Appendix 3 Experiments One and Two: Adapted Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) Items
Need for Cognition a
1. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking
2. I try to avoid situations that require in depth thinking about something
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that
requires little though
4. I prefer complex to simple problems
5. Thinking hard for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction
Faith in Intuition a
6. I trust my initial feelings about people
7. I believe in trust and hunches
8. My initial impressions of people are almost always right
9. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my “gut feelings”
10. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can’t explain how I know
Notes:
a
Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition refer to the participants’ thinking style and is an average of 5 questions
answered on a Likert scale with a range from -3 “Strongly Disagree” to +3 “Strongly Agree.”
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Appendix 4 Experiments One and Two: Task Understanding, Reading Comprehension and
Attention Check Questions
1. Which of the following best describes the purpose of the evaluation of the memo:
a. Your evaluation of the quality of the memo will help to determine the likelihood that the
Analyst will earn an annual bonus
b. Your evaluation of the quality of the memo will help to determine the likelihood that the
Analyst will earn a promotion
c. Do not recall
2.
a.
b.
c.

On average, how many hours per day does Analyst A spend at work?
6 hours
8 hours
10 hours

3.
a.
b.
c.

For this question you are requested to choose answer c) Do not Recall
True
False
Do not recall

Related to the memo you just read, please answer the following two questions:
4.
a.
b.
c.

The Analyst argues that the company is relying on what strategy.a
Life Cycle
Word of Mouth
High Product Quality

5.
a.
b.
c.

The Analyst argues that the company can use the following strategy.a
Price Policy
Life Cycle
Productivity

Notes:
a
This question was asked in Experiment Two as it related specifically to the moderate quality memo. A similar type
of question was asked in Experiment One related to the content of the good quality memo.
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